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ABSTRACT

To the woes of the victims of American over-criminalization, we can
add deprivation of the suitable tools for self-defense during national
emergency and civil unrest. Federal law disarms “unlawful users” of
controlled substances (including medical marijuana), and imposes a
permanent firearms ban on substantially all those with prior felony
convictions. A notable exception is made for white-collar criminals with
felony violations of antitrust and certain business practice statutes.
The constitutionality of these restrictions typically is founded on the
view that one is tainted as “non-virtuous” for any serious criminal
conviction, which includes any felony conviction. Using extensive
sampling, this article shows that reliance on this theory is discredited
outside the context of the Second Amendment. Modern reliance on the
theory, outside the context of firearms rights, has been very infrequent
and has been used to validate odious statutes, in cases no longer good law.
The unsound judicial effort to derive the validation of these firearms
bans from Founding-Era firearms restrictions builds on erroneous
premises. The Founding-Era restrictions, detailed in this article, were
tailored to the circumstances and do not provide a foundation for the
broad, essentially permanent bans that federal law provides and that
courts typically validate.

*

James S. Rollins Professor of Law, University of Missouri.
Copyright © 2020 Royce de R. Barondes. All rights reserved.

[Barondes-firearms-virtuous-accepted.docx]

Table of Contents
I. Introduction ...............................................................................................
II. The Current Federal Felon Prohibition and Its History ........................
III. Representative Outcomes in Contemporary Second Amendment
Challenges to the Felon Ban ....................................................................
IV. Founding-Era Conceptualization Limiting Constitutional Rights to the
Virtuous .....................................................................................................
V. The Absence of a Founding-Era Analogue ..............................................
A. Modern Cases and the Authority on Which They Rely ...................
B. Linking the “Virtuous” to the Need for a Militia .............................
C. Forfeiture for Capital Crime .............................................................
D. Kates’ Historical Recitation Is Unpersuasive ..................................
E. Actual Founding-Era Limits .............................................................
F. Modern Overcriminalization Having No Founding-Era
Analogue ............................................................................................
G. Conclusion ..........................................................................................
VI. Contemporary Cases Referencing the Virtuous Outside the Context of
the Second Amendment ............................................................................
A. Case Statistics ...................................................................................
B. Relevant Supreme Court Authority .................................................
C. Apt References to Virtuous Persons in Contemporary LowerCourt Jurisprudence Citing a Scrutiny Standard ...........................
VII. Conclusion ..................................................................................................

2
7
15
20
22
23
29
31
39
41
46
48
49
49
51
53
62

I. INTRODUCTION
To the woes of the victims of American over-criminalization, we can
add deprivation of the suitable tools for self-defense during national
emergency and civil unrest. In 2020, there has been an astonishing
increase in persons turning to firearms for self-protection, in which firsttime firearms owners are prominently participating.1 Yet federal law
provides that for being an “unlawful user” of controlled substances, even
medical-marijuana used in compliance with state law, one forfeits the
right to possess firearms.2 And a generally permanent firearms ban
attends any felony conviction, whether related to a propensity for violent
1
E.g., Jim Curcuruto, Millions of First-Time Gun Buyers During COVID-19, NSSF
(June 1, 2020), https://www.nssf.org/millions-of-first-time-gun-buyers-during-covid-19/
(noting “year-over-year increases [in retail firearm sales] of 80 percent in March and 69
percent in April 2020,” “estimating that 40 percent of [retail] sales were to [first-time gun
buyers],” and stating, “The early part of 2020 has been unlike any other year for firearm
purchases . . . .”).
2
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116–91) (also including persons
addicted to controlled substances); Arthur Herbert, Assistant Director, Enforcement
Programs and Services, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, Open Letter
to all Federal Firearms Licensees (Sept. 21, 2011), www.atf.gov/firearms/docs/openletter/all-ffls-sept2011-open-letter-marijuana-medicinal-purposes).
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misconduct or not, except—as may epitomize some of the infuriating
aspect of over-criminalization—as to posh criminals whose felonies involve
certain “business practices.” Felony convictions for crimes involving
certain business practices do not result in federal forfeiture of one’s federal
firearms rights.3
These prohibitions have profound impacts in some communities. A
recent article estimates, “people with felony convictions account for 8% of
all adults and 33% of the African American adult male population.”4 A
substantial portion of these persons will have been disarmed for crimes
that do not evidence a higher propensity for violent misconduct.5 Others
will be disarmed by long-stale convictions that are no longer probative of a
propensity to violence.
The constitutionality of these firearms prohibitions has been founded
on a view that supports disarmament of persons who do not have a
heightened propensity to be violent. Courts have relied on the view that
one who has committed a requisite predicate act—current unlawful use of
controlled substances or conviction for any felony—is not “virtuous,” and
the non-virtuous for that alone can be deprived of this express right.6
Sherry describes the Founding Era conceptualization of the “virtuous”
in the following way: “Responsibility, independence and community spirit
are some of the modern concepts that come closest to capturing the
meaning of civic virtue.”7 It has also been described as involving
sublimation of one’s personal interests to those of the common good or
public welfare.8 The rationalization for linking firearms rights to being
“virtuous,” in brief, is that the Founders perceived a need for a virtuous
citizenry, whose exercise of certain civil rights was considered crucial to
See infra notes 43–53 and accompanying text.
Sarah K. S. Shannon et al., The Growth, Scope, and Spatial Distribution of People
with Felony Records in the United States, 1948–2010, 54 DEMOGRAPHY 1795, 1795 (2017).
5
A survey of 2004 state convictions finds, for example, that the most serious
conviction offense for 24 percent of state felony convictions was fraud or mere
drug possession. See, e.g., Matthew R. Durose, Bureau of Justice Statistics, State
Court Sentencing of Convicted Felons, 2004—Statistical Tables tbl.4.2 (July 1,
2007), https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=1533.
6
E.g., United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 685 (7th Cir. 2010) (referencing an
3
4

historical justification for validating the disarmament of persons with felony convictions as
non-virtuous and stating, “And that reasoning applies with equal force to Congress’s
extension of the firearms ban to another category of habitual criminals with § 922(g)(3).”);
United States v. Conrad, 923 F. Supp. 2d 843, 850 (W.D. Va. 2013) (stating that authority
from the Fourth Circuit holds the Second Amendment “is enjoyed only by ‘law-abiding,
responsible citizens;’” that “the government could disarm ‘unvirtuous citizens;’” and that “a
user of controlled and illegal substances[] could not claim the status of being a law-abiding
citizen.” (quoting United States v. Carter, 669 F.3d 411, 416 (4th Cir. 2012))).
7 Suzanna Sherry, “Without Virtue There Can Be No Liberty,” 78 MINN. L. REV. 61, 69
(1993).
8 See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
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effective governance. This perspective is extended by courts to support the
view that the non-virtuous can be deprived of firearms rights.
This article catalogues the contemporary status of not extending
certain constitutional rights to the “non-virtuous,” using sampling to
collect a database of illustrative opinions. It formalizes Adam Winkler’s
casual observations on the subject, provided in the aftermath of the
Court’s initial recognition of the Second Amendment’s protecting an
individual right.9
The sample reveals that modern reliance on this theory is almost
exclusively confined to litigation involving Second Amendment rights.10
The contemporary authority addressing the theory in contexts not
involving the Second Amendment, in fact, typically rejects the principle.
And the primary theme of the infrequent contemporary cases to the
contrary, not involving the Second Amendment, is the support of odious
governmental restriction on intimate activity that are not good law. If
judges validating permanent firearms bans for the “non-virtuous” wish to
rely on constitutional constructs modernly discredited and used to validate
criminalization of private, non-commercial same-sex and heterosexual
intimate activity, their opinions ought to be known by the notorious
intellectual company they keep.
In particular, this article reports the results of a review of each
reported case since 1969 including the word “virtuous” and referencing one
of three contemporary standards of Equal Protection review but not
referencing the term “Second Amendment.”11 The results indicate that
cases depriving persons of firearms rights on the basis they are “nonAdam Winkler, Heller’s Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1551, 1563 n.67 (2009) (citing,
inter alia, Don B. Kates, Jr., The Second Amendment: A Dialogue, 49 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Winter 1986, at 143, 146; and Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the
Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 461, 480 (1995)).
9

Adam Winkler noted, “Scholars have offered two historical bases for excluding felons
from the Second Amendment”: (i) that the amendment’s scope, limited to “the people,”
excludes felons; and (ii) that the Founding-Era understanding was that only “virtuous”
citizens benefitted. Id. As we shall see, see infra notes 120–122 and accompanying text,
modern jurisprudence typically founds the constitutionality of broad firearms bans arising
from prior criminal convictions on the second basis. Relying on exclusion of felons from the
set of “the people” was implicitly rejected in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570,
580 (2008) (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990), where
the Court suggests the term “the people” has a common meaning in various parts of the Bill
of Rights).
Winkler rejected both of those approaches, and tethered the validity of felon
disarmament to felons simply being too dangerous. Winkler, supra, at 1563 n.67. Winkler
articulates the principle for rejecting the second-listed principle in this way: “In modern
constitutional law, rights are not selectively doled out by legislatures to those whom elected
officials deem to be sufficiently virtuous or worthy.” Id.
10 See infra Part V.
11
That is, the following Westlaw search of opinions was performed: adv: virtuous &
(“rational basis” or “intermediate scrutiny” or “strict scrutiny”).
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virtuous” are irreconcilable with the principle, articulated in McDonald v.
City of Chicago,12 that the constitutional rights protected by the Second
Amendment are not “second-class.”13
Additionally, this article details the mechanism in the Founding Era
that would have restrained dangerous conduct of criminals, post-sentence.
It shows those arrangements are not analogous the contemporary federal
firearms ban, which effects a wholesale,14 generally permanent ban on a
broad class of persons—a ban that is untethered to any propensity for
future violence. Rather, the Founding-Era analogues provided a tailored
approach, with an impact that varied based on the circumstances.15 And,
as is often overlooked, the tailored Founding-Era analogues in fact
restricted firearms possession that would not otherwise be a breach of the
peace.16 In sum, judicial efforts to validate permanent felon prohibitions on
firearms possession, on the basis that this view is compelled by the
Founding-Era understanding of firearms rights, simply lack an
understanding of the historical context.
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. Part II sketches the
current contours of the federal prohibition on firearms possession, and its
development. It sketches the oft-overlooked exception in the felon
prohibition, referenced above,17 for some white-collar crimes.18 It also
reveals that the current prohibition is not as longstanding as a casual
561 U.S. 742 (2010).
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 780 (2010) (plurality opinion)
(“Municipal respondents, in effect, ask us to treat the right recognized in Heller as a
second-class right, subject to an entirely different body of rules than the other Bill of Rights
guarantees that we have held to be incorporated into the Due Process Clause.”). See also
Silvester v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 945, 952 (2018) (mem.) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari) (“Nearly eight years ago, this Court declared that the Second Amendment is
not a ‘second-class right, subject to an entirely different body of rules than the other Bill of
Rights guarantees.’” (quoting McDonald, 561 U.S. at 780 (plurality opinion)); id. (“The right
to keep and bear arms is apparently this Court’s constitutional orphan.”); Voisine v. United
States, 136 S. Ct. 2272, 2292 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court continues to
‘relegat[e] the Second Amendment to a second-class right.’” (second alteration in original)
(quoting Friedman v. Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 447, 450 (mem.) (Thomas, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari))).
By way of perspective, one can note that United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013),
relies on an assertion that the non-enumerated right to join in a homosexual marriage
inherently cannot involve a “second-class” or “second-tier” marriage. Id. at 771.
14 As noted below, the federal prohibition has an exception for prior felony convictions
involving some “business practices,” although some state prohibitions arise from any felony
conviction. See infra notes 30, 60 and accompanying text. The existence of this federal
exclusion is not integral to the representative constitutional analysis under which the
federal felon firearms ban is immune from even as-applied challenges. See infra notes 73–
81, 120–122.
15 See infra Part V.E.
16 See infra note 225 and accompanying text.
17 See supra text accompanying note 3.
18 See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
12
13

5

Barondes-firearms-virtuous-accepted.docx

reading of the literature might suggest.19 This latter observation is
relevant, because when the Supreme Court held that the firearms rights
secured by the Second Amendment are individual rights (as opposed to
some form of collective rights),20 it volunteered dicta stating, in relevant
part, “[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons . . . .”21
Although a footnote indicates specified longstanding prohibitions are
merely presumptively lawful,22 the extent to which restrictions are
longstanding is relevant, insofar as courts seek to treat this Supreme
Court dicta as announcing an operative standard.
Our development below of the constitutionality of predicate acts
creating federal firearms bans focuses on the ban for persons with prior
felony convictions. Similar principles have been used to justify the ban
applicable to unlawful users of controlled substances.23
Part III briefly sketches the approaches courts have taken in
challenges to the ban arising from conviction of a crime punishable by
imprisonment of more than one year. As noted there, federal circuits hold
the extant federal felon firearms possession is facially constitutional, with
many (but not all) holding that as-applied challenges are also barred. As
noted in Part III, cases broadly validating the felon firearm prohibition
rely on the notion that the non-virtuous were excluded from benefitting
from constitutionally secured firearms rights.
Part IV briefly sketches the Founding-Era conceptualization of
virtuous citizens. That involved “community spirit,” and sublimation of
personal interests to the common good. Part V demonstrates that the
Founding-Era analogues that restricted the activity of dangerous persons
are qualitatively different from the current, broad felon firearms bans that
some contemporary courts hold are beyond further judicial scrutiny. It
shows the thread of judicial authority that broadly validates felon firearms
possession, exempting them from as-applied challenges, relies on a
disingenuously curated selection of Founding-Era authority.
A focus on the original understanding, to the exclusion of another
approach to constitutional interpretation, is taken, because that is the
19

See infra notes 38–54 and accompanying text.

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008). The holding was made
applicable to the states in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010) (plurality
opinion).
21 Id. at 626.
22
Id. at 627 n.26 (“We identify these presumptively lawful regulatory measures only
as examples; our list does not purport to be exhaustive.”). See generally C. Kevin Marshall,
Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have A Gun?, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 695, 696–97 (2009)
(critically examining the authority for the felon disenfranchisement dicta).
23
See supra note 6 and accompanying text. The choice in the manner of exposition is
dictated by the fact that the primary cases involve felon bans.
20
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approach the relevant courts take. One supposes that, in light of the
ordinary contemporary rejection of the principle that the non-virtuous can
be denied express rights, this judicial choice frames the analysis so as to
bias it in favor of validating the firearms restrictions.
To read into the Second Amendment an implicit exception for those
who had previously committed any serious crime would require that there
was a salient understanding, in the Founding Era,24 that those persons
had permanently forfeited their firearms rights. Because Part V shows
there was no such salient Founding-Era understanding, Part VI then
examines the principle, occasionally referenced in other contexts, that the
non-virtuous may be deprived of constitutional rights.
That Part examines whether the principle is sufficiently recognized
that it may on its own justify the general validation of broad felon firearms
bans. As noted there, very few cases rely on this theory for depriving a
class of persons of constitutional rights. And those that do are no longer
good law, validating restrictions on private, non-commercial sexual
activity. The statutory restrictions those cases validate are odious. The
opinions broadly validating felon firearms bans, and the judges who write
those opinions, ought to be known by the odious intellectual company that
they keep.
II. THE CURRENT FEDERAL FELON PROHIBITION AND ITS HISTORY
In relevant part, federal law currently criminalizes firearms
possession by a person who has been convicted25 of (i) “a crime punishable
There is a threshold issue of whether the historical limit on state restrictions ought
to reference the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. E.g., Gould v. Morgan, 907
F.3d 659, 669 (1st Cir. 2018) (“Because the challenge here is directed at a state law, the
pertinent point in time would be 1868 (when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified).”),
petition for cert. filed (U.S. Apr. 1, 2019) (18–1272). See generally, e.g., Kurt T. Lash,
Beyond Incorporation, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 447, 449 (2009) (stating, “This shift in
the public understanding of individual liberty suggests that what we are after is not the
incorporation of 1787 texts, but the public understanding of 1868 texts . . . .”). In light of
this article’s primary focus on a federal restriction, this article will not probe that
understanding.
25 What constitutes a “conviction” is determined by “the law of the jurisdiction in which
the proceedings were held.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116–91).
This provision can give rise to peculiar issues. For example, a Missouri suspended
imposition of a sentence does not result in a conviction for purposes of depriving a person of
his or her federal firearms rights. United States v. Thornton, 766 F.3d 875, 877 & n.1 (8th
Cir. 2014); but cf. United States v. Love, 59 F. App’x 165, 166 (8th Cir. 2003) (“Under
Arkansas law, a determination that a person is guilty of a felony is a conviction even
though the court suspended imposition of the sentence.”). However, in Missouri, a
suspended execution of sentence does result in a disqualifying conviction. United States v.
Bass, No. 09–CR–00230–DME, 2010 WL 2573990, at *3 (D. Colo. June 23, 2010); see State
v. Fikes, 597 S.W.3d 330, 332 n.3 (Mo. Ct. App. 2019), transfer denied (Jan. 23, 2020),
transfer denied (Apr. 28, 2020); Berryman v. United States, No. 11–0793–CV–W–DGK,
2012 WL 1438760, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 25, 2012).
24
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by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,”26 colloquially referenced
as a ban on felon firearm possession, or (ii) “a misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence.”27 Federal law also criminalizes that possession by a
person currently subject to a specified type of domestic violence
restraining order.28
There is a required interstate commerce nexus, but it is extremely
broad. It extends, inter alia, to any “possess[ion] in or affecting commerce”
and “receiv[ing] any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or
transported in interstate or foreign commerce.”29
However, there are some idiosyncratic limits on what is colloquially
referenced as the federal felon firearms ban. First, it excludes “any Federal
or State offenses pertaining to antitrust violations, unfair trade practices,
restraints of trade, or other similar offenses relating to the regulation of
business practices.”30 Second, it excludes “any State offense classified by
the laws of the State as a misdemeanor and punishable by a term of
imprisonment of two years or less.”31
As a general matter, i.e., subject to some limited exceptions, the
current federal felon firearms ban is permanent.32 The underlying crime
can be either a federal crime or a state crime. The jurisdiction of the
predicate crime may endeavor to ameliorate the collateral firearms
consequences of the conviction, post-sentence. The actual impact of those
restorative actions under federal law is rather complicated,33 and we shall
not endeavor to detail them here.
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116–91).
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). There are other prohibitions, e.g., for “alien[s] . . . illegally or
unlawfully in the United State,” for unlawful users of controlled substances, persons
“adjudicated as . . . mental defective[s],” or “committed to . . . mental institution[s].” Id.
§ 922(g).
28 Id. § 922(g)(8).
29 Id. § 922(g).
30 Id. § 921(a)(20)(A).
31 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(B).
32 A statutorily-authorized process for federal reinstatement of firearms rights has not
been funded in recent years. E.g., Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 439 (7th Cir. 2019).
33 Reinstatement of rights under state law may not reinstate rights under federal law.
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) (“Any conviction which has been expunged, or set aside or for which
a person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored shall not be considered a
conviction for purposes of this chapter, unless such pardon, expungement, or restoration of
civil rights expressly provides that the person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive
firearms.”). A qualifying restoration of “civil rights” requires restoration of civil rights
generally—restoration of firearms rights alone is insufficient. E.g., United States v.
Woodall, 120 F.3d 880, 881 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Estrella, 104 F.3d 3, 6 (1st Cir.
1997) (stating, “[E]ach of the three core ‘civil rights’ must be substantially, but not
perfectly, restored,” and identifying those three as “rights to vote, to hold public office, and
to serve on a jury”).
Additionally, firearms rights cannot be subject to ongoing limitation. Where state law
only partially restores a person’s firearms rights following a state conviction initially
26
27
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Both the historical development of the federal ban on felon firearms
possession and its current scope are often misleadingly described. For
example, Joseph Blocher and Darrell Miller write: “The federal ban on
possession by felons, for example, did not exist until 1938 and did not
extend to all felons until 1968.”34 Lawrence Rosenthal has written, “The
Firearms Act of 1938 required a license to ship firearms in interstate
commerce and prohibited transfers to specified classes of individuals
including certain convicted felons, fugitives from justice, and persons
under indictment.”35 These statements are misleading in a number of
ways.
Dicta in District of Columbia v. Heller,36 discussed below,37 introduced
into the Second Amendment jurisprudence some suggestion that a
restriction being longstanding evidences its validity. In that context, what
might otherwise be innocuous simplifications, misstating the longevity of
firearms restrictions, become substantially misleading. It is therefore
important to detail the extent to which only well after 1968 did the
portfolio of federal firearms restrictions transition to current restrictive
regime.

First, the relevant federal firearms prohibition before 1968 did not
provide a complete ban for covered persons with prior felony convictions.
Rather, by its terms it was limited to “any firearm . . . which has been
shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.38 Moreover, it
was subject to a narrow interpretation, recited in Tot v. United States:39

resulting in a federal firearms prohibition—so there remains a state restriction on the
possession of some firearms—the state restoration of rights will not reinstate federal
firearms rights. Caron v. United States, 524 U.S. 308, 310 (1998). An ongoing state limit
that merely prohibits obtaining a concealed weapons permit has been held sufficient to
prevent firearms rights reinstatement under federal law. Van Der Hule v. Holder, 759 F.3d
1043, 1044–45 (9th Cir. 2014). Curiously, if a state conviction does not result in loss of civil
rights, the rights are not treated as restored for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 921. Logan v.
United States, 552 U.S. 23, 37 (2007).
34
Joseph Blocher & Darrell A.H. Miller, What Is Gun Control? Direct Burdens,
Incidental Burdens, and the Boundaries of the Second Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 295,
327–28 (2016).
35
Lawrence Rosenthal, The Limits of Second Amendment Originalism and the
Constitutional Case for Gun Control, 92 WASH. U.L. REV. 1187, 1211–12 (2015). Rosenthal
relies in part on an opinion written by Judge Easterbrook. Id. at 1223–24. Easterbrook
wrote in part, as to that 1938 act: “The first federal statute disqualifying felons from
possessing firearms was not enacted until 1938; it also disqualified misdemeanants who
had been convicted of violent offenses. (Technically the crime was ‘receipt’ of a gun that had
crossed state lines; the statute treated possession as evidence of receipt.)” United States v.
Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (citation omitted).
36 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
37 See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
38
Federal Firearms Act, Pub. L. No. 75–785, § 2(f), 52 Stat. 1250, 1251 (1938)
(repealed 1968).
39 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
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Both courts below held that the offense created by the Act is
confined to the receipt of firearms or ammunition as a part of
interstate transportation and does not extend to the receipt, in an
intrastate transaction, of such articles which, at some prior time,
have been transported interstate. The Government agrees that
this construction is correct.40
So, before 1968, federal law did not inherently criminalize a felon’s firearm
possession in his or her state of residence.

Second, the current federal ban on possession does not extend to “all”
persons with prior felony convictions. In fact, the 1968 federal felon
firearm possession ban had multiple components that operated to restrict
its scope, which remains in diminished form. The federal prohibition as in
effect in 1968 had provisions that, if given full effect, would have made the
ban’s scope similar to Founding-Era restrictions, which are discussed
below.41
Per Se Exclusion of Certain Crimes Regulating Business Practices. As
noted above,42 the crimes that currently gives rise to a federal firearms
ban exclude “any Federal or State offenses pertaining to antitrust
violations, unfair trade practices, restraints of trade, or other similar
offenses relating to the regulation of business practices.”43 The list of
disqualifying predicate crimes had been expanded by a 1961 statutory
amendment from the more limited set of persons who had committed
“crime[s] of violence”44 (although, as noted above,45 the pre-1968
prohibition had a limited scope and did not operate generally to disarm a
covered person).

40
Id. at 466 (emphasis added); see also Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 226
(1976) (White, J., concurring) (“Thus after Tot, and as long as Congress left § 2(f) intact, to
establish a violation of § 2(f) it was necessary to prove that a convicted felon found in
possession of a firearm actually participated in an interstate shipment.”).
41 See infra Part V.E.
42 See supra note 3, 30 and accompanying text.
43
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(A). This is not prominently discussed in Blocher & Miller,
supra note 34. A Westlaw search of that article for the relevant textual components of the
exclusion (search: adv: (antitrust or “anti-trust” or “trade practices” or “restraints of trade”
or “business practices” or “921(a)(20)!”) reveals a sole reference to antitrust, and that is not
on-point. Blocher & Miller, supra note 34, at 344 n.282.
44
An Act to Strengthen the Federal Firearms Act, Pub. L. No. 87–342, 75 Stat. 757
(1961); see also Marshall, supra note 22, at 698–99 (discussing the historical development
of the federal statutory prohibitions). Continuing our trend of courts overstating the scope
of historical firearms restrictions, United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 2010),
references “the pedigree of the rule against even nonviolent felons possessing weapons
(which was codified in federal law in 1938),” id. at 684, although the limited federal
restriction on firearms possession arising from prior criminal convictions, which did not
prohibit acquisitions in wholly intrastate transactions, see supra note 38 and
accompanying text, was linked to “crime[s] of violence.”
45 See supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text.
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Additional Exclusions from Disqualifying Crimes. As developed
below,46 the Founding-Era procedures for restricting firearms possession
by violent persons were tailored, accommodating assessments that limited
the restrictions to those who had a propensity for violence, and that had
durations that could be tailored to the circumstances.47 The first federal
act that operated broadly, generally to prevent firearms possession by
persons with prior serious convictions, the Gun Control Act of 1968,48 had
multiple mechanisms that can be viewed as seeking to replicate, albeit
imperfectly through different means, the type of tailoring that broad
firearms prohibitions had in the Founding Era. But the mechanisms used
in the Gun Control Act were not implemented efficaciously, and were
curtailed or eliminated.
The Gun Control Act of 1968 delegated authority to the Secretary of
the Treasury to identify other offenses, similar to antitrust and unfair
trade violations, that also would not be disqualifying.49 Thoughtful
exercise of this administrative authority could have operated to exclude
prohibitions being applied to many persons whose convictions did not
evidence higher propensities to commit violence, by a broad regulatory
interpretation of the statutory language. Thus, that could have been a part
of allowing the new, broad federal restrictions to have some significant
level of qualitative similarity to the Founding-Era restrictions.
But the Executive Branch, though administrations of both political
parties, had no appetite to protect the firearms rights of the nondangerous persons with prior convictions. The authority, apparently, was
wholly neglected.50
The federal law transitioned in 1986, from a regime in which Congress
contemplated that the Executive Branch would protect the firearms rights
of certain non-violent offenders, to one that reallocated the neglected
authority to the courts. Although this statutory change was part of an act
styled the “Firearms Owners’ Protection Act,”51 it failed in affording
material protection. The courts have been only slightly better in giving
effect to that limitation on the federal ban,52 which is most succinctly
46
47

See infra Part V.E.
See infra Part V.E.

48
Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90–618, 82 Stat. 1213 (1968) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18 and 26 U.S.C.).
49 Gun Control Act of 1968, § 102, 82 Stat. at 1216; see also supra note 30.
50
United States v. Stanko, 491 F.3d 408, 414 n.4 (8th Cir. 2007) (“Our research has
not revealed any offense so designated by the Secretary under this prior version, nor any
indication of Congress’s rationale for deleting that language.”).
51 Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99–308, 100 Stat. 449 (1986) (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921–926A, 929; and 26 U.S.C. § 5845 (Westlaw through Pub. L.
No. 116–91)).
52 This provision has been given a relatively narrow construction by the courts. United
States v. Stanko, 491 F.3d 408, 415–16 (8th Cir. 2007), states, “[I]mplicit in the term
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evidenced by cavalier omission of the exception from some statements
summarizing the federal firearms prohibitions. That this strand of caselaw
started decades before District of Columbia v. Heller,53 and has analysis
inconsistent with Heller,54 may account in part for the inefficacy of the
statutory provision.
Reinstatement Procedures. The final component of the limits on broad
firearms dispossession otherwise created by the Gun Control Act of 1968
for prior serious crimes, in addition to expungement or pardon,55 consists
of express procedures allowing reinstatement of firearms rights.56
However, “[s]ince 1992, Congress has prohibited ATF from expending
appropriated funds to investigate or act upon applications for relief from
federal firearms disabilities.”57
It is not being suggested that the procedures originally framed in 1986
to allow reinstatement of firearms rights, together with the exclusions for
various crimes referenced above, initially resulted in a scope of federal
firearms prohibitions equivalent to the scope of the corresponding
provisions in the Founding Era. Reinstatement, when last funded, was not

‘unfair trade practices’ is the requirement of an adverse economic effect on competition or
consumers.” The exclusion has been found not to extend to prior convictions concerning,
inter alia, (i) a fraudulent check-cashing scheme, United States v. Miller, 678 F.3d 649,
651, 653 (8th Cir. 2012); (ii) “conspiracy to manufacture or distribute equipment for
decrypting satellite cable signals” and for “willfully infring[ing] a copyright,” United States
v. Coleman, 609 F.3d 699, 702, 705–06 (5th Cir. 2010); (iii) fraudulent distribution of
adulterated meat products and their misbranding, and related deceptive conduct, Stanko,
491 F.3d at 410, 418–19 (asserting that the purpose of predicate crimes was “to protect
public health” and that the crimes “do not involve an economic effect on competition or
consumers”); (iv) “bringing a lady’s wristwatch worth $9,000 into the United States by
means of a false customs declaration,” United States v. Meldish, 722 F.2d 26, 27 (2d Cir.
1983); and (v) importation of tobacco products without paying requisite state tax, United
States v. Horma, No. 3:18CR18, 2018 WL 4214136, at *12 (E.D. Va. Sept. 4, 2018). But see
Reyes v. Sessions, 342 F. Supp. 3d 141, 144, 156 (D.D.C. 2018) (holding, inter alia, prior
conviction under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), for
securities fraud, arising from false filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission, is
within the exception). See generally United States v. Geyler, 932 F.2d 1330, 1336 n.9 (9th
Cir. 1991) (indicating federal convictions for “mail fraud or securities fraud” are outside the
exception), abrogated on other grounds by Beecham v. United States, 511 U.S. 368 (1994).
53 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
54
E.g., Meldish, 722 F.2d at 28 (stating, “Because the receiving and possessing of
firearms is not a basic constitutional right, the classification must be upheld if it has any
rational support.”).
55 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
56
See Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90–618, § 102, 82 Stat. 1213, 1225 (1968)
(codified in pertinent part, as amended, in 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No.
116–91)).
57
Granting of Relief; Federal Firearms Privileges, 84 Fed. Reg. 1491, 1492 (Feb. 4,
2019). However, since 1993, the prohibition has not applied to corporations’ requests. Id.
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widespread. Only 313 persons had firearms rights reinstated in 1991
through the above-described procedure.58
Rather, the point is that courts or scholars may be inclined to frame
the federal restrictions as banning, since 1968 (or some earlier point in
time), firearms possession by all persons with prior felony convictions, so
that such restrictions are “longstanding” and, thus, deemed constitutional
under dicta in Heller. And that framing is simply incorrect. The broad
federal ban for those with prior convictions, first adopted in 1968, had a
number of exceptions that allowed judicial and Executive Branch action to
mitigate the broad ban, so that the federal ban could have had an impact
similar to the results of the tailored process extant in the Founding Era.
And notwithstanding a general congressional logjam in respect of firearms
rights, Congress in 1986 endeavored to make efficacious one of the
previously neglected curbs on those firearms restrictions, albeit again
without much effect.
It is a separate question whether, if those curbs had been vigorously
implemented in the 1970s, any variation in their structure or impact from
the Founding-Era analogue would have been too substantial from the
Founding-Era restrictions to be constitutional. But, whatever the proper
analysis of those counterfactual possibilities would be, it remains clear
that the current, broad restriction dates only from 1993 (although the ban
as to violent persons with prior felony convictions would predate that59),
and it is not as a whole “longstanding.”
State Prohibitions. There are, of course, state prohibitions on firearms
possession arising from prior convictions. The acts giving rise to a
prohibition in some states include, inter alia, the commission of any
felony60 (or even an out-of-state misdemeanor that would be a felony if
See Granting of Relief, Federal Firearms Privileges, 56 Fed. Reg. 65,926 (Dec. 19,
1991); Granting of Relief, Federal Firearms Privileges, 56 Fed. Reg. 36,865 (Aug. 1, 1991);
Granting of Relief, Federal Firearms Privileges, 56 Fed. Reg. 26,713 (June 10, 1991);
Granting of Relief, Federal Firearms Privileges, 56 Fed. Reg. 14971 (Apr. 12, 1991).
59
Reinstatement was denied in the Gun Control Act of 1968 to persons with felonies
involving the use of firearms. Gun Control Act of 1968, § 102 (adding 18 U.S.C. § 925(c)).
Those crimes, and some other set of violent crimes, would not have involved regulation of
business practices, and could not have been excluded by Executive Branch action.
60
E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16–11–131(b), (d) (Westlaw through Laws 2020, Act 322)
(prohibition for one “who has been convicted of a felony by a court of this state or any other
state; by a court of the United States including its territories, possessions, and dominions;
or by a court of any foreign nation,” but providing a restoration procedure where the
predicate crime was an antitrust, etc., violation); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140, § 129C
(Westlaw through Ch. 44 of the 2020 2d Ann. Sess.) (criminalizing firearms possession by
one not possessing a firearm identification card, subject to various exceptions); id.
§ 129B(1)(i), (ii) (prohibiting issuance of firearm identification card to person with prior
felony conviction, whether under federal, Massachusetts or other state jurisdiction); id. ch.
269, § 10(h) (setting punishment for firearms possession absent compliance with § 129C);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 624.713.1(10)(i) (Westlaw through legislation effective through Apr. 18,
58
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committed in-state)61—so a state felon firearm ban may be broader than
the federal one. However, a state ban may not be permanent62 or may have
some complex nuance.63
Assessment of the constitutionality of the federal felon prohibition on
firearms possession requires one keep in mind certain basic principles
underlying heightened levels of constitutional scrutiny. The presence of a
mismatch between the objective of a restriction on a constitutional right
and the means used raises concerns that the restriction reflects proscribed
hostility to the right, as opposed to advancing the putative interest; the
mismatch urges against its constitutionality.64 The current federal ban,
2020); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202.360(1)(b) (Westlaw through 80th Reg. Sess. (2019))
(expressly referencing felonies under the laws of another state or the United States); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2–308.2(A) (Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. and 2020 Reg. Sess, cc. 1, 64,
198, 201, 202, 247, 249, 255, 278, 356, 478, 603, 620, 659, 660, 701, 808, 831, 941, 1093,
1200, 1202, 1220, 1231, 1234 & 1272) (providing prohibition arising from any felony,
expressly referencing crimes in other states and under federal law, but providing
restoration procedure).
61
MO. ANN. STAT. § 571.070.1(1) (Westlaw through 2019 1st Reg. Sess. and 1st Extra.
Sess. of the 100th Gen. Assembly) (criminalizing firearms possession by one “convicted of a
felony under the laws of this state, or of a crime under the laws of any state or of the
United States which, if committed within this state, would be a felony”); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
941.29(1m)(b) (Westlaw through 2019 Act 186) (referencing conviction "of a crime
elsewhere that would be a felony if committed in this state”); State v. Campbell, 642
N.W.2d 230, 232–33 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001) (noting that although the predicate crime in Ohio
involved acts within Wisconsin’s corresponding felony, although the Ohio statute omitted
an element in the corresponding Wisconsin statutory felony; holding the predicate crime
prohibited firearms possession). See generally LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:95.1(A) (Westlaw
through the 2019 Reg. Sess.) (prohibiting firearms possession by a person convicted of
assorted Louisiana crimes or a person “who has been convicted under the laws of any other
state or of the United States or of any foreign government or country of a crime which, if
committed in this state, would be one of the above-enumerated crimes”).
Other anomalies arise from a conviction in one state creating a prohibition in another
state. In Hamilton v. Pallozzi, 848 F.3d 614 (4th Cir. 2017), the complainant previously had
“his civil rights restored by the Governor of Virginia and his firearms rights restored by the
Virginia courts.” Id. at 617. Hamilton validates Maryland’s determination that the
conviction continued to result in a Maryland prohibition, until such time as the Virginia
Governor provided the complainant a “full pardon.” Id. at 628. Similar issues are presented
in Moran v. Wisconsin Department of Justice, 932 N.W.2d 430, 443–34, 436 (Wisc. Ct. App.
2019) (reaching a similar conclusion as to a Wisconsin prohibition).
62 E.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 11.61.200(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) (Westlaw through ch. 31, 2020 2d
Reg. Sess.) (providing felon prohibition ends 10 years after “unconditional discharge on the
prior offense,” excluding homicide convictions); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30–7–16(A)(1), (D)(3)
(Westlaw through laws in effect through May 20, 2020) (providing felon prohibition lasting
ten years from later of completion of sentence or probation); OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 166.270(1), (4)(a) (Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess.) (excluding most convictions upon 15
years after imprisonment, parole or probation).
63
E.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.04(a) (Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.)
(permanent ban from felony conviction, except for possession at “the premises at which the
person lives” at least five years following release from confinement or, if later, release from
supervision or parole).
64 In discussing strict scrutiny, Peter Rubin notes:
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disarming some nonviolent offenders, but not visiting the harsh
consequences on select white-collar criminals, reflects that form of dubious
mismatch.
III. REPRESENTATIVE OUTCOMES IN CONTEMPORARY SECOND AMENDMENT
CHALLENGES TO THE FELON BAN
A typical contemporary treatment of as-applied challenges to felon
firearms possession involves a two-step process.65 In the first step, the
court determines whether the individual is within the scope of the
protection of the Second Amendment. A misdemeanor conviction may be
deemed “serious” for this purpose.66
At this stage, a court may frame the issue as the Second Amendment’s
protection only extending to the virtuous.67 So, at this step, a court may
[T]he inquiry into narrow tailoring—into the fit between classification and
proffered goal—serves at least three distinct purposes. First, it ensures that the
stated purpose was indeed the actual purpose behind the classification. A narrow
tailoring inquiry can help to “smoke out” illegitimate purposes by demonstrating
that the classification does not, in fact, serve the stated, legitimate purpose.”
Peter J. Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose: A Comprehensive Approach to Strict
Scrutiny After Adarand and Shaw, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 14 (2000) (citing City of Richmond
v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion)).
65
See, e.g., Binderup v. Att. Gen. U.S., 836 F.3d 336, 346–47 (3d Cir. 2016) (plurality
opinion) (citations omitted) (“At step one of the Marzzarella decision tree, a challenger
must prove . . . that a presumptively lawful regulation burdens his Second Amendment
rights. This requires a challenger to clear two hurdles: he must (1) identify the traditional
justifications for excluding from Second Amendment protections the class of which he
appears to be a member, and then (2) present facts about himself and his background that
distinguish his circumstances from those of persons in the historically barred class.” (citing
United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010)). See generally David B. Kopel &
Joseph G.S. Greenlee, The Federal Circuits’ Second Amendment Doctrines, 61 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 193, 227–28 (2017) (collecting cases).
66 See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
67
Binderup v. Attorney General United States, 836 F.3d 336, 348–49 (3d Cir. 2016),
states:
“[M]ost scholars of the Second Amendment agree that the right to bear arms was
tied to the concept of a virtuous citizenry and that, accordingly, the government
could disarm ‘unvirtuous citizens.’ ” Several of our sister circuits endorse the
“virtuous citizen” justification for excluding felons and felon-equivalents from the
Second Amendment's ambit.
People who have committed or are likely to commit “violent offenses”—crimes “in
which violence (actual or attempted) is an element of the offense,”—undoubtedly
qualify as “unvirtuous citizens” who lack Second Amendment rights. But Heller
recognized “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons,” not
just violent felons. The category of “unvirtuous citizens” is thus broader than violent
criminals; it covers any person who has committed a serious criminal offense, violent
or nonviolent. To the extent Barton suggests that people who commit serious crimes
retain or regain their Second Amendment rights if they are not likely to commit a
violent crime, it is overruled.
Id. at 348–49 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (first quoting United States v.
Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 684–85 (7th Cir. 2010); then quoting United States v. Skoien, 614
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conclude that a prior serious conviction puts the individual outside the
protection of the Second Amendment.68
If the claimant is not within the protection of the Second Amendment,
any subsequent review will be under a highly deferential approach such as
a rational basis test.69 This may be the case, even if the claimant
thereafter led an exemplary life.70
Otherwise, in the second step, the court needs to ascertain the
standard of review—because the Supreme Court has not settled on a
standard of review.71 And, of course, it would need to apply that standard.
Some federal circuits allow as-applied challenges by persons subject to
the felon firearms ban in section 922(g)(1);72 others do not. The Seventh
Circuit noted in 2019:
Relying on the “presumptively lawful” language in Heller and
McDonald, every federal court of appeals to address the issue has
held that § 922(g)(1) does not violate the Second Amendment on
its face.
However, courts of appeals are split as to whether as-applied
Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1) are viable. On the
one hand, the Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits
have suggested that § 922(g)(1) is always constitutional as applied
to felons as a class, regardless of their individual circumstances or
the nature of their offenses.
The First Circuit has not foreclosed as-applied challenges, but
it has expressed some skepticism about them. . . .

F.3d 638, 640, 642 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc); then quoting District of Columbia v. Heller,
554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008)) (citing United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 174 (3d Cir. 2011),
overruled by Binderup, 836 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2016)).
68
But see Barton, 633 F.3d at 174 (stating, “Similarly, a court might find that a felon
whose crime of conviction is decades-old poses no continuing threat to society. The North
Carolina Supreme Court did just that in Britt v. State, 363 N.C. 546, 681 S.E.2d 320
(2009), finding that a felon convicted in 1979 of one count of possession of a controlled
substance with intent to distribute had a constitutional right to keep and bear arms, at
least as that right is understood under the North Carolina Constitution.”), overruled by
Binderup, 836 F.3d 336.
69
E.g., Medina v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 152, 156 (D.C. Cir. 2019), cert. denied sub nom.
Medina v. Barr, No. 19–287, 2019 WL 6689673 (U.S. Dec. 9, 2019).
70
E.g., Medina, 913 F.3d 152, 160–61 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“A prohibition on firearm
ownership, like these other disabilities, is a reasonable consequence of a felony conviction
that the legislature is entitled to impose without undertaking the painstaking case-by-case
assessment of a felon’s potential rehabilitation.”).
71
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634 (2008) (noting the dissent
“criticizes us for declining to establish a level of scrutiny for evaluating Second Amendment
restrictions”).
72 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116–91).
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On the other hand, we, along with the Fourth, Eighth, and
D.C. Circuits, have left room for as-applied challenges to the
statute.73
Federal courts within the Third Circuit have at times seemed
relatively aggressive in reviewing bans arising from prior convictions. The
en banc decision in Binderup v. Attorney General United States74 gave rise
to a fractured analysis set forth in three opinions: an opinion announcing
the judgment of the court,75 a concurrence in part and in the judgment,76
and a concurrence in part and a dissent in part.77 The opinion announcing
the judgment concludes an individual can, in an as-applied claim,
demonstrate a state misdemeanor triggering the federal possession ban is
not sufficiently serious to put him or her outside the protection of the
Second Amendment.78
Binderup addresses certain convictions treated as misdemeanors
under state law but punishable by more than two years. In the opinion
announcing the court’s judgment, the court finds the individuals
demonstrated they had not been convicted of “serious crimes.” Hence, they
had adequately demonstrated they were not in the class of “persons
historically excluded from the right to arms.”79
Where courts have allowed as-applied challenges for disqualifications
arising from crimes deemed less serious, a not uncommon view would treat
a serious offense as permanent stain—one that cannot be cleansed by
subsequent honorable conduct. For example, Tripodi v. Sessions80 states,
“As a result, ‘the passage of time or evidence of rehabilitation’ will not
‘restore the Second Amendment rights of people who committed serious
crimes.’ Any allegations regarding the age of the conviction or the
offender's rehabilitation are thus irrelevant to our analysis.”81
A few cases hold that the statutory disqualifications from firearms
possession either (i) are unconstitutional, as applied, or (ii) adequately
alleged a constitutional violation. We can provide a few illustrations.
Courts have held there were adequate allegations of a Second Amendment
violation arising from prohibitions for:
Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 442–43 (7th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted).
836 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc).
75 Binderup, 836 F.3d at 339 (Ambro, J.) (announcing the judgment of the court).
76 Binderup, 836 F.3d at 357 (Hardiman, J.) (concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (joined by four other judges).
77
Binderup, 836 F.3d at 380 (Fuentes, J.) (concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(joined by six other judges).
78
Binderup, 836 F.3d at 349, 351–52 (Ambro, J.) (announcing the judgment of the
court).
79 Binderup, 836 F.3d at 353 (Ambro, J.) (announcing the judgment of the court).
80 339 F. Supp. 3d 458 (E.D. Pa. 2018).
81 Tripodi, 339 F. Supp. 3d at 463 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (footnote omitted) (quoting Binderup,
836 F.3d at 349 (plurality opinion)).
73
74
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(i) a conviction for driving under the influence, having a 2-1/2 year
a maximum possible sentence;82 and
(ii) possession of a short-barreled shotgun whose barrel had been
shortened after having been damaged.83
Courts have held it unconstitutional to found a permanent federal
firearms prohibition on the following predicate crimes:84
(i) a guilty plea, made eighteen years prior, to corrupting a minor,
arising from a consensual sexual relationship with a 17-year-old
employee (a misdemeanor punishable by up to five years);85
(ii) a stale (26-year-old) state misdemeanor conviction for
unlawfully carrying a handgun without a license (punishable by up to
three years), against a person now holding a “Secret” federal
government security clearance in connection with his job as a
consultant for a government contractor;86
(iii) a correction officer’s predicate state misdemeanor conviction
for carrying an unlicensed firearm;87 and
(iv) a misdemeanor conviction for alteration of documentation
allowing car window tint, so as to make it appear to apply it to a
different vehicle.88
There are, however, recent cases less charitable in treating requests
for reinstatement following a stale adverse mental health determination89
82
Baginski v. Lynch, 229 F. Supp.3d 48, 49, 57 (D.D.C. 2017) (denying summary
judgment for the government).
83 Robinson v. Lynch, No. 2:16–CV–00150–DB–EJF, 2017 WL 1131896, at *2 (D. Utah
Mar. 24, 2017) (“The Court finds Mr. Robinson’s proposed Amended Complaint pleads
particular facts likely making plausible his claim that § 922(g)(1), as applied to the
‘severable subcategory of persons’ to which Mr. Robinson belongs, deprived Mr. Robinson of
his constitutional rights.”); First Amended Complaint at 3–4, Robinson, No. 2:16–CV–
00150–DB–EJF, 2017 WL 1131896 (D. Utah Mar. 24, 2017) (identifying predicate crime as
involving conviction for possession of a short-barreled shotgun, whose barrel had been
shortened after having been damaged).
84
We are here examining the ban arising from prior criminal convictions. We are not
detailing challenges to other bans, e.g., arising from a prior determination of mental
incapacity. E.g., Keyes v. Lynch, 195 F. Supp. 3d 702, 706–08, 720 (M.D. Pa. 2016) (holding
unconstitutional a ban arising from an eight-day involuntary commitment, at the age of 15
precipitated by the divorce of the claimant’s parents, of an Army veteran now a correctional
officer whose employment involves carrying a firearm). See also Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty.
Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 681, 683, 699 (6th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (lead opinion) (holding
there were adequate allegations of a Second Amendment violation arising from a
prohibition based on a two- to four-week commitment, thirty years prior, after a divorce).
85
Binderup, 836 F.3d at 340, 356–57 (Ambro, J.) (announcing the judgment of the
court).
86 Id. at 340, 356–57.
87
Clark v. Sessions, 336 F. Supp. 3d 535, 538, 542, 545 (W.D. Pa. 2018) (crime
punishable by up to five years incarceration).
88 Miller v. Sessions, 356 F. Supp. 3d 472, 476, 485 (E.D. Pa. 2019).
89
E.g., Simpson v. Sessions, Civil Action No. 16–1334, 2017 WL 1910141, at *1, *6
(E.D. Pa. May 10, 2017) (stating in dismissing claims seeking injunctive relief by a person
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or challenging a ban arising from conviction for particular crimes.90
Illustrative recent circumstances arose from:
(i) a prior federal felony conviction for misprision of felony;91
(ii) a twenty-seven-year-old federal felony conviction for “making a
false statement to a lending institution,” in connection with applying
for a $30,000 loan;92
(iii) a federal felony conviction for making a false statement in a
matter within the jurisdiction of the Executive Branch, involving a
false claim on forms for unemployment insurance and omission of 53
days of actual work, resulting in the wrongful receipt of $1,628;93
(iv) a state misdemeanor conviction for driving under the
influence (treating the misdemeanor as “serious” and holding the
challenge failed at the first step);94
(v) a federal felony conviction for fraud arising from sale of foot
inserts falsely described as meeting Medicare thickness requirements
(based on application of the second step of the analysis, eliding
application of the first step);95

involuntarily committed for two days, fifteen years prior, “[T]he passage of time is
immaterial to the analysis in this matter. There is no exception to § 922(g)(4) for the
passage of time.”).
90 Dave Kopel and Joseph Greenlee state, “No convicted violent felon has succeeded in
an as-applied challenge to the federal statute.” Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 65, at 226.
91 United States v. Phillips, 827 F.3d 1171, 1173–75 (9th Cir. 2016).
92
Medina v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 152, 154, 160 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (stating, “[W]e hold
that those convicted of felonies are not among those entitled to possess arms,” and “[The
claimant] argues that an examination of his ‘present, complete character’ places him back
within the class of ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens.’ We disagree.”), cert. denied sub nom.
Medina v. Barr, No. 19–287, 2019 WL 6689673 (U.S. Dec. 9, 2019).
93
Hatfield v. Barr, 925 F.3d 950, 951–53 (7th Cir. 2019); Hatfield v. Sessions, 322 F.
Supp. 3d 885, 887 (S.D. Ill. 2018) (identifying the number of days), rev’d sub nom. Hatfield
v. Barr, 925 F.3d 950 (7th Cir. 2019).
94
Holloway v. Att. Gen. U.S., 948 F.3d 164, 173, 177–78 (3d Cir. 2020) (stating “that
Holloway’s DUI conviction constitutes a serious crime, placing him within the class of
‘persons historically excluded from Second Amendment protections.’ Because Holloway has
not met his burden at the first step of the analysis to overcome the presumptive application
of § 922(g)(1), § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to him, and he is not entitled to relief.”
(plurality opinion) (footnote omitted) (quoting Binderup v. Att. Gen. U.S., 836 F.3d 336, 347
(3d Cir. 2016)); see also Williams v. Barr, 379 F. Supp. 3d 360, 364, 380 (E.D. Pa. 2019)
(stating, “The statistical evidence shows that individuals convicted of an alcohol-related
offense have a four to five-fold increase of being arrested for a crime of violence or firearmrelated offense, as compared to individuals with no prior criminal history.”); State v.
Culver, 918 N.W.2d 103, 106, 115 (Wis. Ct. App. 2018) (addressing a felony predicate
offense), review denied, 923 N.W.2d 165 (Wis. 2019).
95 Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 438, 440, 447, 451 (7th Cir. 2019) (applying the second
step of the analysis without deciding whether the predicate felony resulted in the challenge
failing the first step).
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(vi) a ten-year-old guilty plea to a state misdemeanor for theft of
two saws worth a total of $1,900, which was punishable by up to five
years incarceration, holding the challenge failed at the first step;96
(vii) a seven-year-old federal felony conviction for filing a false tax
return, for which the individual had made a $257,796.39 restitution
payment, holding the challenge failed at the first step;97 and
(viii) a guilty plea to a state felony for tampering with state
records, punishable by up to seven years imprisonment, arising from
overbilling the state in operation of a funeral business and failure to
forward reimbursements and ultimately resulting in payment of
$7,125 in restitution.98
IV. FOUNDING-ERA CONCEPTUALIZATION LIMITING CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS TO THE VIRTUOUS
This Part briefly summarizes the relationship between the need for a
virtuous citizenry and the broad contours of the governance structure
envisioned by the founders. Our summary yields the following conclusions:
There was an appreciation for a need for a “virtuous” citizenry. But
“virtuous” in this context had a different connotation from the
contemporary one. It contemplated participation in governance,
sublimating personal interests to the needs of the public.
Suzanna Sherry has written, “Eighteenth century Americans believed
that their experiment with liberty would stand or fall on the civic virtue of
the citizenry.”99 She provides an introductory description of “civic virtue”
as “a general picture of citizens who are willing and able to participate in
the public life of their community and their nation.”100 Sherry wryly
illustrates the divergence between the connotation of a “virtuous” citizen
Baumiller v. Sessions, 371 F. Supp. 3d 224, 228, 233 (W.D. Pa. 2019).
Folajtar v. Barr, 369 F. Supp. 3d 617, 618–19 & n.4, 622, 624 (E.D. Pa. 2019).
98
United States v. Irving, 316 F. Supp. 3d 879, 882–883, 888, 893 (E.D. Pa. 2018)
(stating, “[A]s a felon convicted of a serious crime, Hunt Irving fell outside the protection of
the Second Amendment . . . .”), appeal filed sub nom. United States v. Hunt-Irving, No. 19–
1636 (3d Cir. Mar. 25, 2019).
99 Suzanna Sherry, “Without Virtue There Can Be No Liberty,” 78 MINN. L. REV. 61, 68
(1993).
100 Sherry, supra note 99, at 68. Sherry elaborates as follows:
When eighteenth century Americans spoke of virtue, they invoked several
intertwined ideas, all of which stemmed from the classical tradition of political
participation as the highest human good. Responsibility, independence and
community spirit are some of the modern concepts that come closest to capturing the
meaning of civic virtue. A virtuous citizen had an independent mind and a
willingness to use it for the good of the community. Virtue meant taking
responsibility for oneself and one’s community. Virtue also meant letting reason
control passion, letting long-term community interests override selfish individual
wants. Citizens in a virtuous republic deliberated rationally about what would best
serve the interests of the community.
Id. at 69.
96
97
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in the era of the Revolutionary War and in modern times. She writes, “One
of my colleagues snickered when he first heard the title of this speech; he
assumed that ‘virtue’ was used in its predominant modern sense of sexual
chastity. In the eighteenth century, however, ‘virtue’ meant something
quite different.”101
Some of Sherry’s Founding-Era illustrations include: “Samuel Adams
wrote that men ‘will be free no longer than while they remain virtuous.’
His cousin and political opposite, John Adams, said that ‘public Virtue is
the only Foundation of Republics.’”102 Stephen Feldman has written:
Under republican democracy, citizens and elected officials were
supposed to be virtuous; in the political realm, they were to
pursue the common good or public welfare rather than their own
partial or private interests. When citizens or officials used
government institutions to pursue their own interests, then the
government was corrupt.103
Academic commentary long ago focused on the relationship between
this need for a virtuous citizenry and the Second Amendment.104 David
Williams, for example, notes “Service in the militia trained one to a life of
virtue, both self-sacrificing and independent . . . . “105 He further notes,
“Colonial records are full of complaints that the militia, reflecting the
sentiment of the people, refused to enforce edicts perceived as unjust, or
even participated in popular resistance to them. Colonial culture accepted
some measure of violent resistance as a normal part of life, although those
in authority never ceased to complain of that fact.”106
A need for a particular form of militia participation is, of course, a
separate matter from whether a class of certain persons—persons deemed
not virtuous—would be permanently disarmed. To say that one class of
Sherry, supra note 99, at 69.
Id. at (footnote omitted) (first quoting Letter from Samuel Adams to John Scollay
(Dec. 30, 1780), in 4 THE WRITINGS OF SAMUEL ADAMS 236, 238 (Harry Alonzo Cushing ed.,
1908); then quoting Letter from John Adams to Mercy Warren (April 16, 1776), in 1 THE
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 670 (Philip Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987)).
103
Stephen M. Feldman, The End of the Cold War: Can American Constitutionalism
Survive Victory?, 41 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 261, 264 (2015) (footnote omitted); see also, e.g.,
Richard A. Epstein, Beyond the Rule of Law: Civic Virtue and Constitutional Structure, 56
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 149, 155–56 (1987) (discussing “civic virtue” as “an important concern
in political theory both before and during the framing of our constitution”); Alan Hirsch,
Direct Democracy and Civic Maturation, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 185, 191 (2002) (“In
Federalist 55, [Madison] reiterated that republican government presupposes ‘sufficient
virtue among men for self-government.’ ” (quoting The Federalist No. 55, at 346 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
104
E.g., David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The
Terrifying Second Amendment, 101 YALE. L.J. 551 (1991); see also infra notes 120–124 and
accompanying text.
105 Id. at 556.
106 Id. at 581 (footnote omitted).
101
102
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persons is needed to engage in some activity says nothing about the
propriety of treating the complementary class of persons in a particular
way. In the immediately following Part V, we illuminate that, in fact, the
Founding-Era treatment of those one might categorize as “non-virtuous,”
on account of some prior conviction for serious crimes, were not inherently
subject to permanent firearms bans.
V. THE ABSENCE OF A FOUNDING-ERA ANALOGUE
Other works have addressed certain aspects of the collateral
consequences, in the Founding Era, of the commission of a felony, as that
term was then used. The purpose of this Part is not to attempt to provide a
comprehensive treatment of that historical context. Rather, the core of this
article is to address the contemporary treatment of the rights of persons
classified as not virtuous, and to put in context assertions that the
Founding-Era treatment of the non-virtuous mandates that there is an
implicit restriction appended to the Second Amendment, by which all who
have committed felonies are excluded. Our presentation of perspectives
from centuries ago is limited to providing the backdrop necessary to
contextualize our core investigation.
Subpart A notes the link identified in some contemporary
jurisprudence that ties benefit under the Second Amendment to being
virtuous. The seminal is analysis in some late twentieth-century
scholarship by Don Kates. Subpart B illuminates the logical fallacy in
finding the Founding-Era’s perception of a need for a virtuous citizenry to
man the militia implies some adverse treatment of “non-virtuous” citizens
was mandated. The discredited view does not demonstrate non-virtuous
persons were permanently disarmed, and it is inconsistent with Heller’s
acknowledgement that benefit from the Second Amendment is decoupled
from militia service.
Subpart C reveals that broad validation of felon firearms bans reflects
an erroneous understanding of the Founding-Era consequences of
forfeiture associated with commission of capital crimes. Subpart D shows
the historical record on which the relevant cases rely is a disingenuously
curated selection of Founding-Era authority. Subpart E shows the
Founding-Era analogues restricting the activity of dangerous persons were
not broad, generic, class-wide prohibitions untethered to the disarmed
person’s propensity to commit unlawful violence. Rather, those analogues
contemplated tailoring.
Subpart F expands on the well-known dissonance between
contemporary over-criminalization and what might have given rise to a
Founding-Era restriction on firearms possession. It provides an
illustration of activity, in which a most prominent founder participated,
that modernly could give rise to a permanent firearms ban.
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A. Modern Cases and the Authority on Which They Rely
The opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller,107 ancillary to its
recognition of the right to bear arms as an individual right,108 provides
dicta addressing felon disenfranchisement. It states, “[N]othing in our
opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the
possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the
carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government
buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the
commercial sale of arms.”109 A footnote indicates these longstanding
prohibitions are merely presumptively lawful.110
Kevin Marshall notes that the Heller dicta concerning “longstanding”
bans relies on gossamer authority.111 The Court did not endeavor to detail
the nexus between that dicta and Founding-Era firearms restrictions. The
above quote is preceded by the phrase, “[a]lthough we do not undertake an
exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second
Amendment,”112 and the majority opinion makes few references to felons or
felonies.113
The term “longstanding” appears to have been used in the Heller
opinion simply for purposes of providing a consciously imprecise reference
to a class of restrictions that were vaguely termed as “presumptively
lawful.” The discussion is not in the language of a rule or a standard. That
554 U.S. 570 (2008).
Id. at 595 (“There seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both text and history, that
the Second Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms.”).
109 Id. at 626–27.
110 Id. at 627 n. 26 (“We identify these presumptively lawful regulatory measures only
as examples; our list does not purport to be exhaustive.”).
111 Marshall, supra note 22, at 696–97.
The core of this article is an examination of the unsuitability of referencing whether
persons are “virtuous” as a basis for allowing them to be permanently disarmed.
Affirmatively stating the suitable contours of Second Amendment protection is a much
wider undertaking and beyond the scope of this article. Lund cogently notes a starting-off
point for such an investigation (although one might seek change the emphasis of the
sources of identified purposes to emphasize the text and other objective sources): “When the
text does not supply an adequately precise answer, a conscientiously originalist court has
no choice but to decide the issue in light of the purpose of the provision as that purpose was
understood by those who adopted it. This is not an algorithm . . . .” Nelson Lund, The
Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1343, 1372
(2009).
112 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.
113
The character string “felon” appears only four times in the majority opinion. In
addition to the above reference, the opinion:
•
references the Heller claimant receiving a license, upon success in the litigation,
“if he is not a felon and is not insane;” Heller, 554 U.S. at 631; and
•
twice, in discussing Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55 (1980), describes “an
appeal from a conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm,” Heller, 554
U.S. at 625 n.25, accompanied by a note that in Lewis, “The challenge was based
on the contention that the prior felony conviction had been unconstitutional.” Id.
107
108
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the dicta does not provide a rule, or even a governing standard, is
elucidated by the incongruity of concluding that a practice is constitutional
merely because it has been practiced for some decades, i.e., it is
“longstanding.”114
Lower courts have attempted to shore up the doctrinal foundation of
concluding felon disarmament is constitutional by referencing restricting
constitutional rights to the virtuous. Although a few earlier cases
referenced the “virtuous” in sketching the contours of the scope of firearms
rights,115 at least based on citation tallies,116 reliance on this theory gained
prominence in the contemporary Second Amendment with United States v.
Vongxay.117 The conclusions seem driven in large measure by reference to
a sketch of Founding-Era perspectives on firearms rights that is

114 E.g., United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“It would
be weird to say that § 922(g)(9) is unconstitutional in 2010 but will become constitutional
by 2043, when it will be as ‘longstanding’ as § 922(g)(1) was when the Court decided
Heller.”). See also id. at 640 (“The opinion is not a comprehensive code; it is just an
explanation for the Court’s disposition. Judicial opinions must not be confused with
statutes, and general expressions must be read in light of the subject under
consideration.”).
115
The first reported opinion involving firearms rights including the terms “virtuous”
and “second amendment” is State v. Workman, 14 S.E. 9 (W. Va. 1891). The case involves a
statute criminalizing the carrying of a revolver (or certain other dangerous weapons, not
including rifles) outside his or her place of dwelling. Id. at 9 (reproduced in court-written
syllabus). The statute did not criminalize public possession in transit to or from a place for
repairing the arm. Id. The statute also provided a defense for a person the jury finds “a
quiet and peaceable citizen, of good character and standing in the community in which he
lives, [where] . . . he had good cause to believe . . . that he was in danger of death or great
bodily harm at the hands of another person, and that he was in good faith, carrying such
weapon for self-defense and for no other purpose.” Id.
The opinion construes the statute non-literally. As part of apparently discussing the
constitutionality of the restriction, in light of “discrimination . . . between classes,” the
court indicates that a person without good character, although not benefitting from a
“statutory” defense, “is left in the hands of the jury, under full protection of the common
law and the constitution.” Id. at 11. As to this issue, the court concludes, “This is a
discrimination, it is true, between classes; but it is only a discrimination in favor of the
virtuous class against the dangerous and vicious.” Id.
116
A Westlaw search “adv: virtuous & “second Amendment,” sorted by Westlaw by
“Most cited,” lists fourth United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2010). Only one
of the three more-cited cases, United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1040 (10th Cir.
2009), predates Vongxay, and the Westlaw citation statistics suggest it is oft-cited for its
Fourth Amendment analysis. As of May 25, 2020, Westlaw reported 89 citing references to
McCane being to a headnote with a heading “Arrests and Stops,” out of only 148.
A second competitor for most prominently cited initial authority on this matter, United
States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 2010), relies Vongxay:
Whatever the pedigree of the rule against even nonviolent felons possessing
weapons (which was codified in federal law in 1938), most scholars of the Second
Amendment agree that the right to bear arms was tied to the concept of a virtuous
citizenry and that, accordingly, the government could disarm “unvirtuous citizens.”
Yancey, 621 F.3d at 684–85 (citing Vongxay, 594 F.3d at 1118).
117 594 F.3d at 1118.
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incomplete and ultimately off-point. The basic contours of the approaches
these courts take are:
•

First, the perceived need in the Founding Era for a virtuous
citizenry arose from the need for an adequate militia.
However, omitted from these cases is dispositive evidence that,
in the Founding Era, the general class of persons previously
convicted of serious crimes, following any confinement, were
actually disarmed in perpetuity.

•

Second, the consequences of civil death, arising from conviction of a
capital crime, involved forfeiture of assets.118
That, of course, does not speak to an ongoing forfeiture of arms,
or a prohibition on their possession, after any initial forfeiture and
any period of confinement for a person who, in the Founding Era,
was not subject to capital punishment.119

We shall first examine Vongxay, as well as some other contemporary
authority, then examine the authority on which this strand of caselaw
relies, and then address omitted information.
In Vongxay, the court, in part quoting Don Kates, states:
Finally, we observe that most scholars of the Second
Amendment agree that the right to bear arms was “inextricably
. . . tied to” the concept of a “virtuous citizen[ry]” that would
protect society through “defensive use of arms against criminals,
oppressive officials, and foreign enemies alike,” and that “the
right to bear arms does not preclude laws disarming the
unvirtuous citizens (i.e. criminals) . . . .” We recognize, however,
that the historical question has not been definitively resolved.120
118
119

See, e.g., infra note 142 and accompanying text.
See generally Marshall, supra note 22, at 715 (stating, as to one’s being obligated to

forfeit property at a particular time, “But it did not follow that one could not thereafter
purchase and hold new personal property—including a gun.”).
120 Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Kates, supra note 9, at 146)
(citing, inter alia, Marshall, supra note 22, at 714–28, and providing the following
parenthetical summary of this portion of Marshall’s discussion: “maintaining that bans on
felon gun possession are neither long-standing nor supported by common law in the
founding era”). In the article written by Kates that the court quotes, Kates further writes:
In classical republican political philosophy, the concept of a right to arms was
inextricably and multifariously tied to that of the “virtuous citizen.” Free and
republican institutions were believed to be dependent upon civic virtu which, in
turn, depended upon each citizen being armed—and, therefore, fearless, self-reliant,
and upright. . . . One implication of this emphasis on the virtuous citizen is that the
right to arms does not preclude laws disarming the unvirtuous citizens (i.e.,
criminals) or those who, like children or the mentally unbalanced, are deemed
incapable of virtue.
Kates, supra note 9, at 146.
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Reliance on this approach is common.121 A recent opinion from the
D.C. Circuit conforms to this approach, with increased verbosity that
continues to elide providing actual evidence of permanent, broad
disarmament, post-sentence, of persons who had committed serious crimes
in the Founding Era.122
Let us turn to what is provided in Kates’ seminal academic works, on
which Vongxay relies.123 Kates had written:
In classical republican political philosophy, the concept of a
right to arms was inextricably and multifariously tied to that of
the “virtuous citizen.” Free and republican institutions were
Marshall identifies pre-Heller authority led astray by academic misreading of the
historical traditions. Marshall describes United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 226 n.21
(5th Cir. 2001), as relying on a law review article that conflates historical restrictions on
voting, recognized in a 1903 treatise, with restrictions on firearms. Marshall, supra note
22, at 709.
121 See Binderup v. Att. Gen. U.S., 836 F.3d 336, 348 (3d Cir. 2016) (plurality opinion)
(stating, “Several of our sister circuits endorse the ‘virtuous citizen’ justification for
excluding felons and felon-equivalents from the Second Amendment’s ambit. . . . People
who have committed or are likely to commit ‘violent offenses’—crimes ‘in which violence
(actual or attempted) is an element of the offense,’—undoubtedly qualify as ‘unvirtuous
citizens’ who lack Second Amendment rights.” (citation omitted) (quoting United States v.
Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc)).
122 Medina v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 152 (D.C. Cir. 2019), cert. denied sub nom. Medina v.
Barr, 140 S. Ct. 645 (2019), states:
A number of other circuits have also considered this issue and have concluded
that history and tradition support the disarmament of those who were not (or could
not be) virtuous members of the community. At least four circuits have endorsed the
view that “most scholars of the Second Amendment agree that the right to bear
arms was tied to the concept of a virtuous citizenry and that, accordingly, the
government could disarm ‘unvirtuous citizens.’ ” The “virtuous citizen” theory is
drawn from “classical republican political philosophy” and stresses that the “right to
arms does not preclude laws disarming the unvirtuous (i.e. criminals) or those who,
like children or the mentally imbalanced, are deemed incapable of virtue.” Several
circuits have relied on this theory to uphold the constitutionality of modern laws
banning the possession of firearms by illegal aliens and juveniles—classes of people
who might otherwise show, on a case-by-case basis, that they are not particularly
dangerous. In considering these decisions, we recognize that there is “an ongoing
debate among historians about the extent to which the right to bear arms in the
founding period turned on concerns about the possessor’s virtue.” While we need not
accept this theory outright, its support among courts and scholars serves as
persuasive evidence that the scope of the Second Amendment was understood to
exclude more than just individually identifiable dangerous individuals.
...
On balance, the historical evidence and the Supreme Court’s discussion of felon
disarmament laws leads us to reject the argument that non-dangerous felons have a
right to bear arms.
Id. at 159 (citations omitted) (first quoting United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 684–85
(7th Cir. 2010); then quoting United States v. Rene E., 583 F.3d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 2009)
(quoting Reynolds, supra note 9, at 480); then quoting Rene E., 583 F.3d at 16).
123 See supra note 120.
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believed to be dependent upon civic virtu which, in turn, depended
upon each citizen being armed—and, therefore, fearless, selfreliant, and upright. . . . One implication of this emphasis on the
virtuous citizen is that the right to arms does not preclude laws
disarming the unvirtuous citizens (i.e., criminals) or those who,
like children or the mentally unbalanced, are deemed incapable of
virtue.124
Consider, further, the observations of Cornell and DeDino, in journal
article body text and an accompanying footnote:
Those seeking pardon were not robbed of a right to free speech or
free exercise of their religion, rights indisputably associated with
individuals. Instead, the penalties deal more with the rights and
obligations associated with a citizen’s duty to society:
participation in government as a political official, participation in
the legal process as a juror, participation in the electoral process
as a voter, and participation in the militia.139
The disqualifications are also similar in nature to the sorts
of privileges taken away regularly from convicted felons today.125
139

One can assess the extent to which contemporary courts have relied
on the relationship between the Second Amendment and a virtuous
citizenry through a number of lenses. As a threshold matter, one might
conclude that contemporary American society is not “virtuous,” as that
term was used in the Founding Era; thus, the Second Amendment should
not be the fount of contemporary rights.126 We shall pass on that
perspective, because it is inconsistent with Heller127 and McDonald.128
Alternatively it is apparently asserted by some that it is too
administratively burdensome for courts to be required to make
individualized determinations—it will produce an “avalanche of
litigation.”129 Much as our society will not say the Fourth Amendment can
Kates, supra note 9, at 146. Vongxay also quotes Glenn Reynolds to that effect,
although the citation is not meaningful but, rather, a judicial echo chamber; the cite is to
Reynolds reiterating Kates. Vongxay, 594 F.3d at 1118 (quoting Reynolds, supra note 9, at
480).
125
Saul Cornell & Nathan DeDino, A Well Regulated Right: The Early American
Origins of Gun Control, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 487, 508 & n.139 (2004).
126
See generally Williams, supra note 104, at 561 (examining Wendy Brown’s
assertion that she “cannot imagine a less appropriate appellation for the contemporary
American Citizenry, which bears a shared commitment to almost nothing, least of all a
common good.” (quoting Wendy Brown, Guns, Cowboys, Philadelphia Mayors, and Civic
Republicanism: On Sanford Levinson’s The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE
L.J. 661, 663 (1989)).
127 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
128 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
129
Justice Stevens remarked as follows in dissenting as to applying the Second
Amendment to the states, “[T]oday’s decision invites an avalanche of litigation that could
124
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be ignored, because it enmeshes courts in constant litigation concerning
the validity of searches, it also cannot properly state that it is satisfactory
to deprive a class of persons broadly of their Second Amendment rights
because requiring additional individualized evidence will give rise to a
significant amount of litigation. This approach is also, of course,
inconsistent with the contemporary political movement urging adoption of
“Red-Flag Laws” creating judicial procedures for deprivation of firearms
rights untethered to criminal convictions.130 A judiciary that the political
process concludes has enough capacity to deprive persons of constitutional
rights has enough capacity to restore them.
There is a separate issue as to whether courts are competent to make
assessments of future danger. Lawrence Rosenthal has written, “Perhaps
only those convicted of felonies regarded as dangerous should be barred
from possessing firearms, as some commentators have argued. This
approach, however, would enmesh courts in the difficult predictive
business of judging which felonies present unacceptable risk of future
firearms-related misconduct, a type of judgment alien to the framing-era
regime.”131 Again, the solution to the circumstance that it is difficult for a
court to make a decision is not to eliminate broadly, in a summary process,
a constitutional right. That mistakes may be made in some cases is not a
reason unjustifiably to deprive other people, on a wholesale basis, of a
constitutional right. And, as we shall see,132 Rosenthal’s last point,
concerning that sort of judicial weighing being “alien” in the Founding
Era, is manifestly in error.
Rather, we shall examine the reliability and comprehensiveness of the
authority Kates presents, and the extent to which acts that currently give
rise to permanent firearms bans correspond to circumstances giving rise to
firearm bans in the Founding Era.

mire the federal courts in fine-grained determinations about which state and local
regulations comport with the Heller right—the precise contours of which are far from
pellucid—under a standard of review we have not even established.” McDonald, 561 U.S. at
904 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Bonidy v. U.S. Postal Serv., 790 F.3d 1121, 1128
(10th Cir. 2015) (stating, in justifying a general rule prohibiting firearms possession on
post office property, “Under a more nuanced or discretionary regime, problems of perceived
unfairness or unreasonableness—and accompanying litigation—would likely multiply, not
disappear.”).

See generally Red Flag Laws: Examining Guidelines for State Action: Hearing
Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 116th Cong. (2019) 3 (Statement of David B. Kopel), https://
130

www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Kopel%20Testimony1.pdf
(discussing
various
proposals and enactments, and concluding, “Nearly a third of such orders are improperly
issued against innocent people.”).
131
Rosenthal, supra note 35, at 1218 & n.148 (footnote omitted) (providing inapt
authority not referencing the Founding Era but, rather, difficulty in application of a
contemporary statute).
132 See infra Part V.E (discussing bonds).
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B. Linking the “Virtuous” to the Need for a Militia
Does not Demonstrate All Persons Previously Convicted of Serious
Crimes Were Actually Disarmed. Cases linking the scope of the Second
Amendment to the Founding-Era conceptualization of the militia and a
virtuous citizenry, and the authority on which these cases rely, are
founded on abstract analyses. They do not provide evidence of a
widespread understanding in the Founding Era, evidenced by widespread
practice throughout the land at that time, that persons with prior
convictions were, post-sentence, subject to permanent firearms bans. It is,
frankly astonishing a court would modernly opt to curtail an enumerated
right based on a theoretical assessment of the underpinnings of the need
for a militia, as conceptualized in the Founding Era, without clear, direct
evidence that those previously convicted of serious crimes were subject to
wholesale, permanent disarmament in the Founding Era.
We shall below detail the actual mechanisms that were present in the
Founding Era to address dangerous persons, post-sentence.133 As we shall
see, those tools involved nuanced, context-specific mechanisms. They do
not provide a basis for validating the overbroad wholesale, permanent
prohibitions in current law.
Separately, in the Founding Era, human life was conceptualized as a
divine gift that the recipient was under an affirmative obligation to
protect.134 Bearing arms for self-defense was a means for discharging this
duty. So, relying on this view—that Founding-Era norms contemplated
persons post-sentence ought to be broadly disarmed—would require some
clear indication that the event giving rise to disarmament sufficiently

133

See infra Part V.E.

Dwight Duncan and Peter Lubin write, “To understand what Jefferson meant by
‘inalienable rights to life [and] liberty’ we have to look to Locke’s Second Treatise.” Dwight
G. Duncan & Peter Lubin, The Use and Abuse of History in Compassion in Dying, 20 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 175, 205 (1996). They continue, quoting, inter alia, a portion of Locke’s
chapter on “The State of Nature,” to the following effect: “Every one as he is bound to
preserve himself, and not to quit his Station wilfully . . . .” Id. (quoting JOHN LOCKE, TWO
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 270–71 (Peter Laslett ed., 1988) (emphasis in original). Thomas
McAffee and Michael Quinlan write, “In fact, speaking from a tradition that is as much
republican as liberal, many advocates of this period referred to a duty of self-preservation
as warranting armed resistance, as much as a right of self-defense.” Thomas B. McAffee &
Michael J. Quinlan, Bringing Forward the Right to Keep and Bear Arms: Do Text, History,
or Precedent Stand in the Way?, 75 N.C. L. REV. 781, 842 n.201 (1997). They reference a
Founding-Era sermon that they describe as “enjoining the people to ‘furnish themselves
with weapons proper for their defense and learn the use of them’ [and] “arguing that ‘[m]en
are bound to preserve their own lives,’ and refusal to act on this duty is ‘criminal in the
sight of God.’ ” Id. (quoting Simeon Howard, A Sermon Preached to the Ancient and
Honorable Artillery Company in Boston (1773), in 1 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING
THE FOUNDING ERA (1760–1805), at 185, 197, 201 (Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz
eds., 1983).
134
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tainted the wrongdoer’s life so that this obligation to protect it, with the
tools available, no longer existed.
Inconsistent with Heller, Which Rejects Linking the Second
Amendment to Militia Service. To say that the need for a virtuous
citizenry was linked to the need for a militia as a logical matter says
nothing about whether those deemed “non-virtuous” can be disarmed. This
style of thought is akin to concluding that because one reason to close a
dwelling’s windows is to prevent rain infiltration, one need not adopt the
crime prevention strategy of closing one’s home windows during sunny
workdays to prevent burglaries.
The fallacy arises from implicitly treating one purpose for the
operative text in the Second Amendment as its sole purpose that therefore
curtails the operative provision. Of course, controlling American
constitutional law directly rejects cabining the Second Amendment to
militia-related activity. Heller notes, “The prefatory clause does not
suggest that preserving the militia was the only reason Americans valued
the ancient right; most undoubtedly thought it even more important for
self-defense and hunting.”135 And Heller directly rejected the argument,
proffered by the District of Columbia, that the Second Amendment
“protects only the right to possess and carry a firearm in connection with
militia service.”136
Relatedly, there is a manifest dissonance that would arise from this
militia-centric conceptualization. As Heller notes, the original federal
militia act excluded women and persons over the age of 45.137 As Jeffrey
Giancana has noted,138 the Second Militia Act of 1792139 does not expressly
exclude, from the militia requirement to possess arms, all persons
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599 (2008).
Heller, 554 U.S. at 577 (providing this summary of the District of Columbia’s
position—a position the court ultimately rejects).
137
Heller, 554 U.S. at 596 (citing An Act More Effectually to Provide for the National
Defence by Establishing an Uniform Militia Throughout the United States, ch. 33, § 1, 1
Stat. 271, 271 (1792) (current version at 10 U.S.C. §§ 246–247 (Westlaw through Pub. L.
No. 116–91)) (confusingly referencing this act as the “first Militia Act”). In 1792, a first
Militia Act was passed on May 2. An Act to Provide for Calling Forth the Militia to Execute
the Laws of the Union, Suppress Insurrections and Repel Invasions, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264
(1792), repealed by An Act to Provide for Calling Forth the Militia to Execute the Laws of
the Union, Suppress Insurrections, and Repel Invasions; and to Repeal the Act Now in
Force for Those Purposes, ch. 36, § 10, 1 Stat. 424, 425 (1795); and a second Militia Act was
passed on May 8. 1 Stat. 271 (1792). See, e.g., Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370,
386–87 & n.11 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (referencing “the second Militia Act of 1792”), aff'd sub nom.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
138
Jeffrey Giancana, Note, The “Scourge” of Armed Check Fraud: A Constitutional
Framework for Prohibited Possessor Laws, 51 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 409, 416 (2018)
(stating a mandate in the act “to purchase a firearm lacked a carved-out exemption for
felons.”).
139 Second Militia Act §§ 1, 2, 1 Stat. 271, 271–72.
135
136
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previously convicted of serious crimes. It is a non-sequitur to say the
Founding-Era conceptualization of the militia compels the conclusion that
a class of persons (those with prior criminal convictions of some sort) do
not benefit from an express constitutional right, when:
(i) there is no salient evidence members of that class were excluded, on
a wholesale basis, from the militia duties of firearms ownership; and
(ii) it is not seriously claimed that the classes of persons who were
expressly excluded from federal militia duties in the Founding Era (women
and those over forty-five) do not benefit from the Second Amendment.
Now, perhaps there was some practice, not reflected in statutory
language, excluding criminals, post-sentence, from any and all militia
obligation that escapes identification in contemporary judicial opinions. In
any case, any Founding Era nexus between militia obligations and prior
convictions was not sufficiently widespread and salient—core to the
Founding-Era understanding of firearms rights—to compel the conclusion
that the operative clause of the Second Amendment is subject to an
implicit limit that, as we shall see,140 relies on a wholly discredited
constitutional theory.
C. Forfeiture for Capital Crime
The relevant contemporary caselaw references the Founding-Era
treatment of persons convicted of capital crimes. Medina v. Whitaker141
notes, “In 1769, William Blackstone defined felony as ‘an offense which
occasions a total forfeiture of either lands, or goods, or both, at the
common law, and to which capital or other punishment may be
superadded, according to the degree of guilt.’ ”142 Yet, the opinion then
notes, “Felonies were so connected with capital punishment that it was
‘hard to separate them.’ ”143 Notwithstanding the implicit link between
imposition of capital punishment and forfeiture it just recognized, the
Medina opinion proceeds to treat Founding-Era principles governing
forfeiture as informing Founding-Era treatment of persons who were not
given capital punishment:
[F]elonies were—and remain—the most serious category of crime
deemed by the legislature to reflect “grave misjudgment and
maladjustment.” With this perspective, it is difficult to conclude
that the public, in 1791, would have understood someone facing

140
141

See infra Part VI.

913 F.3d 152 (D.C. Cir. 2019), cert. denied sub nom. Medina v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 645

(2019).

142
Medina, 913 F.3d at 158 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *95
(Harper ed. 1854)).
143 Id. (quoting 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 142, at *98).
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death and estate forfeiture to be within the scope of those entitled
to possess arms.144
Missing from the opinion is articulation of a rationale why theoretical
musings about the underpinnings of the treatment of persons sentenced to
death in the Founding Era is sufficient to compel a conclusion concerning
how courts should interpret a constitutional right.
Erroneously Equating Founding-Era Capital Crimes with All Serious
Crimes. Attributes of civil death in the Founding Era would have included
forfeiture of assets145 and an inability to enforce contracts146 or otherwise
to initiate litigation.147 It is not the case that in the Founding Era, all
crimes having “serious” punishments were capital. A 1749 Massachusetts
act imposed three years imprisonment, and other punishments, for
anonymous extortion.148 A 1790 federal statute imposed imprisonment of
up to seven years, and a fine or possibly other ancillary punishments, for
conviction of numerous crimes such as:
•
•

•

misprison of treason;149
maliciously maiming a person “within any of the places upon the
land under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States,
or upon the high seas, in any vessel belonging to the United States,
or to any citizen or citizens thereof,” and150
destruction, etc., of records of courts of the United States.151

Numerous other crimes were punishable
imprisonment for more than one year, such as:

under that statute

by

144
Medina, 913 F.3d at 158 (first quoting Will Tress, Unintended Collateral
Consequences: Defining Felony in the Early American Republic, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 461,

468, 473 (2009); then quoting Hamilton v. Pallozzi, 848 F.3d 614, 626 (4th Cir. 2017)).
145 See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
146 See Marshall, supra note 22, at 715.
147
E.g., 1 J. CHITTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 725 (London, A.J.
Valpy 1816) (stating “he can bring no action, nor perform any of the legal functions which
before he was admitted to discharge”); Holmes v. King, 113 So. 274, 275 (Ala. 1927).
148
Act of 1749, ch. 234, § 1, reprinted in THE CHARTERS AND GENERAL LAWS OF THE
COLONY AND PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY 570 (Boston, T.B. Wait & Co. 1814)
(providing the following punishment for anonymous extortion: “sitting on the gallows for
the space of one hour, with a rope around his, her or their neck, and afterwards shall be set
upon the pillory, in their have one of his, her or their ears cut off,” and three years of
imprisonment while “kept to hard work,” and whipping each three months.).
A 1711 Massachusetts act imposed for robbery “of another travelling the common road
or highway” a punishment of six months imprisonment, “burning in the forehead or hand,”
and treble damages; a second conviction was a capital offense. An Act for Suppressing of
Robberies and Assaults (1711), ch. 103, § 1, reprinted in THE CHARTERS AND GENERAL LAWS
OF THE COLONY AND PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY 392, 393 (Boston, T.B. Wait & Co.
1814).
149 An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, ch. 9, § 2,
1 Stat. 112, 112 (1790) (act codified as amended in scattered sections).
150 Id. § 13, 1 Stat. at 115.
151 Id. § 15, 1 Stat. at 115–16.
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•
•
•
•
•

misprison of murder or other felony on the high seas or property
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States (up to 3
years);152
manslaughter on property within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
United States (up to 3 years);153
confederacy to become a pirate (up to three years);154
perjury in the courts of the United States (up to three years);155 and
bribery of a federal judge (“fined and imprisoned at the discretion of
the court”).156

The federal statute expressly provided that a conviction for none of
those serious crimes “shall work corruption of blood, or any forfeiture of
estate.”157 So, it simply was not the case that in the Founding Era, all
serious crimes were accompanied by civil death and forfeiture of one’s
assets.158
These specific statutes referenced above are set forth merely for
purposes of providing discrete, incontrovertible illustrations. One
interested in a broader conclusion could turn to the Chitty treatise, which
states, “[A]ll those offences which exist at common law, and have not been
regulated by any particular statute, are within the discretion of the court
to punish.”159 In sum, a diminished role of capital punishment arose from a
combination of statutory revision and liberal reduction of charges by grand
juries.160

152
153
154
155
156
157
158

Id. § 6, 1 Stat. at 113.
Id. § 7, 1 Stat. at 113.
Id. § 12, 1 Stat. at 115.
Id. § 18, 1 Stat. at 116.
Id. § 21, 1 Stat. at 117.
Id. § 24, 1 Stat. at 117.
See also, e.g., Boardman v. Gore, 15 Mass. 331, 337 (1819) (“These reasons do not

exist with us. There is no forfeiture of lands or goods on conviction of crimes; nor is there
any recompense provided by the public; nor is the criminal party punished with death
. . . .”).
159 1 CHITTY, supra note 147, at 710.
160 See, e.g., 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.6(b) (4th ed. Westlaw
through Dec. 2019) (“As to punishment, although the colonial criminal law was harsh by
modern standards, it was considerably less severe than English law. In part that was due
to changes in the severity of authorized punishment, but more significant was the
utilization of a sentencing scheme that gave officials discretionary authority to be lenient in
order that the penalty actually imposed take account of the ‘circumstances of the criminal
[and] not just the crime.’ Some colonies (most notably Pennsylvania) sharply reduced the
number of offenses for which capital punishment could be imposed, but the more critical
elements in the less frequent use of that penalty were the willingness of grand juries to
downgrade charges to non-capital offenses, the willingness of juries similarly to convict on
lesser offenses, liberal exercise of the power to pardon, and the ready availability of benefit
of clergy in some colonies for first-offenders convicted of capital crimes.” (footnotes omitted)
(quoting DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN
THE NEW REPUBLIC 50 (1971))); Donald Braman, Punishment and Accountability:

33

Barondes-firearms-virtuous-accepted.docx

Forfeiture Associated with Imposition of Capital Punishment, or
Sometimes Incarceration for Life. As a general matter, civil death was
linked to imposition of a capital sentence.161 The chapter on civil death
(attainder) in Chitty’s 1816 treatise on criminal law begins, “When
sentence has been pronounced upon a criminal for a capital offense, he is
immediately by operation of law placed in a state of attainder.”162 The text
later states, “The word attainder is derived from the Latin term attinctus,
signifying stained or polluted, and includes, in its meaning, all those
disabilities which flow from a capital sentence.”163
One can assess the nature of the nexus by noting what a Missouri
court, in the nineteenth century, needed to reference in identifying civil
death not linked to imposition of a capital sentence: conviction for
supporting a foreign government, and the Pope in particular.164
One can encounter some variation from this general principle. An
example would be a statute providing for the administration of the estate
of a person sentenced for life as if dead in fact.165 Another example would
be “imprisonment for life and the loss of all the profits of his lands, with
the forfeiture of the whole of his personal estate,” for “having rescued an
offender from any of the superior courts.”166
Understanding and Reforming Criminal Sanctions in America , 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1143,
1168–69 (2006) (“In colonial America, many formal and informal sanctions focused
attention on the claims that others in the community had on the offender. The most typical
forms of punishment were fines, the posting of bond, and sureties, with shaming, corporal
punishment, banishment, and the death penalty also employed, though less frequently.”
(footnotes omitted)).
161
See generally Marshall, supra note 22, at 715 (stating the following generalization
(some small adjustments to which we shall provide below, see infra notes 165–166 and
accompanying text), “No death sentence meant no property disability.”).
Chitty clarifies that consequences of civil death do not include forfeiture of all rights, so
that one is transmuted into property to be trifled with at anyone’s pleasure. Chitty writes,
“[T]he person of an attainted felon is still under the protection of the law, and therefore the
position of Blackstone, ‘that the law takes no further care of him than barely to see him
executed,’ must be taken with some allowance. To kill him without warrant is murder . . . .”
1 CHITTY, supra note 147, at 726 (footnotes omitted) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *380).
162 1 CHITTY, supra note 147, at 723 (first emphasis added).
163 1 CHITTY, supra note 147, at 725 (last emphasis added).
164 Murphy & Glover Test-Oath Cases, 41 Mo. 339, 344 (1867) (“Death was not always
the consequence of an attainder. For instance, a party attainted of a præmunire did not
forfeit his life; death was not the penalty attached to a judgment in such cases.”).
165
Holmes v. King, 113 So. 274, 276 (Ala. 1927) (“A statute of Missouri, declaring a
convict sentenced for life ‘shall thereafter be deemed civilly dead,’ provides, also, for the
administration of his estate as if dead in fact.” (quoting Williams v. Shackleford, 11 S.W.
222, 222 (Mo. 1889)). But cf. Platner v. Sherwood, 6 Johns. Ch. 118, 124–25 (N.Y. Ch. 1822)
(“It seems, then, that perpetual imprisonment, or perpetual banishment without forfeiture
of the estate, did not, in England, produce civil death, or, at least, did not devest the party
of his estate.”).
166 1 CHITTY, supra note 147, at 707 (emphasis removed).
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For our purposes, then, one might focus on the fact that civil death
was typically linked to imposition of a capital sentence, although some of
the consequences might attend a life sentence. And there might be some
other ancillary exceptions. In any case, this variation shows that, in the
Founding Era, forfeiture was from coextensive with commission of each
and every “serious” crime.
And there is authority from long ago expressly stating that forfeiture
of rights upon a conviction did not fully extend to one no longer confined:
“And, upon obtaining a parole, in the absence of express restrictions, he is
restored to his liberty to go at large and to his natural right to the fruits of
his own labor so long as he lives up to the conditions of the parole. This
would logically carry with it the right to make contracts and to acquire
and dispose of his own private property.”167
American Tradition Restricted Application of Civil Death. The
American approach did not adopt the full scope of the common law civil
death.168 The Supreme Court of Oklahoma stated as to statutes providing
for civil death arising from a felony conviction, “[T]he full significance of
such statutes have never been enforced by our courts for the principal
reason that they are out of harmony with the spirit of our fundamental
laws and with other provisions of statutes.”169 Similarly, Holmes v. King
notes, “In the absence of statute, the doctrine of ‘civil death’ has been
generally denied in this country.”170 Chadwick v. Knox states a convict in
prison can contract for otherwise lawful services for assistance with
seeking a pardon—which would be inconsistent with the notion that he or
she was, in full, civilly dead.171
Over hundred years ago, the Oklahoma Supreme Court distinguished
the treatment of a felon’s natural rights and other legal rights, noting a
modern trend under which natural rights are not abridged other than by
express statutory provision.172 Similarly, Miller v. Turner173 also
separately treats restriction of natural rights. The court states the
collateral consequences of a conviction do not include limits on making

Byers v. Sun Sav. Bank, 139 P. 948, 950 (Okla. 1914).
See Marshall, supra note 22, at 715 (stating “the[] doctrines did not carry over to
the United States in their strict English form”).
169 Byers, 139 P. at 949.
170 113 So. at 275.
171
31 N.H. 226, 235 (N.H. Super. Ct. Judicature 1855) (stating he “may employ
another to do such acts as may be rightfully and properly done for his relief, and contract to
pay him for his services and to repay him his expenses. Such a contract . . . is free from any
just exception, and binding upon the parties.”).
172
Byers, 139 P. at 949 (referencing a “modern trend . . . to extend, rather than to
limit, those natural rights . . . except in states where they are expressly abridged by
statute”).
173 253 N.W. 437 (N.D. 1934).
167
168
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contracts and maintaining actions “which concern his personal liberty and
are based on natural rights as distinguished from legal rights.”174
In sum, the American tradition was not one of exuberant
implementation of the ancient regime of civil death. The American
tradition is limited to restrictions expressly adopted by statute,
particularly as to natural rights. Of course, the right to bear arms is
classified as a natural right.175 Understanding the contemporary authority
does not point to Founding Era statutes broadly imposing permanent
firearms disabilities, post-sentence, for each and every “serious” crime, it
is inconsistent with the American experience to say that those broad
restrictions are engrained in the American tradition.
The law in a colony, on the other hand, could expressly restrict
firearms possession in identified, limited circumstances post-sentence, as
revealed by study of an early nineteenth century compendium of
Massachusetts law assembling acts from and after the mid-seventeenth
century. A search of that book revealed Massachusetts acts expressly
providing for forfeiture of arms for only a limited subset of serious crimes.
Under a 1692 Massachusetts act, conviction of affray required the
offender’s imprisonment “until he find sureties for the peace and good
behavior,” and forfeiture of “his armour or weapons” as well as a potential
fine.176 The only other remotely apt reference in that compendium of
Massachusetts law, revealed by an electronic search, to a forfeiture and
either “weapons” or “armour” is not specific as to those items.177 It involves
253 N.W. at 439.
E.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 593–94, (2008) (“Blackstone,
whose works, we have said, ‘constituted the preeminent authority on English law for the
founding generation,’ cited the arms provision of the Bill of Rights as one of the
fundamental rights of Englishmen. . . . It was, he said, ‘the natural right of resistance and
self-preservation’ . . . .” (citations omitted) (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715
(1999); then quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *139); id. at 594 (referencing
additional authority); Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846) (referencing a person’s “ natural
right of self-defence, or of his constitutional right to keep and bear arms”); see United
States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875) (describing the Second Amendment in the
following terms, “This is not a right granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any
manner dependent upon that instrument for its existence.”).
176 An Act for the Punishing of Criminal Offenders (1692), ch. 11, § 6, reprinted in THE
CHARTERS AND GENERAL LAWS OF THE COLONY AND PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY 237,
240 (Boston, T.B. Wait & Co. 1814). The only other reference to “affray” in that
compendium of Massachusetts law, as of the early Nineteenth Century, is in a 1719 act
concerning dueling, etc., which does not reference forfeiture of weapons. Act for the
Punishing and Preventing of Dueling (1719), ch. 131, § 1, reprinted in THE CHARTERS AND
GENERAL LAWS OF THE COLONY AND PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY 422, 422 (Boston, T.B.
Wait & Co. 1814).
177 According to an electronic search, a word with the stem “forfeit” appears within two
pages of “weapon” or “weapons” or “armour” on 16 pages of that book, according to a search
of the book in the database, The Making of Modern Law: Primary Sources, Gale Cengage
Learning. (“Armor” does not appear.) Twelve are manifestly irrelevant to our issue,
involving forfeiture of land, THE CHARTERS AND GENERAL LAWS OF THE COLONY AND
174
175
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a 1751 act criminalizing the armed participation in rioting of twelve or
more persons, and failure to disperse after an hour of order.178 That act
provided for forfeiture of all one’s land and goods (“or such a part thereof
as shall be adjudged by the justices before whom such offense shall be
tried”), in addition to whipping and one year’s imprisonment.179
This illustration appears to be representative. Kevin Marshall,
apparently in connection with recounting the state of the law up to the
publication of a 1903 treatise, writes, “The closest thing to a case
considering a felon disability, in 1878, struck down a regulation of pistol
carrying to the extent that it required forfeiting the offending pistol upon a
conviction. The law did not ban the offender from obtaining a new
pistol.”180
Ameliorated by Benefit of Clergy. It would appear that one cannot
assess the nature of collateral consequences of convictions for capital
crimes without referencing the broader context. In the Founding Era, the
harsh consequences of a conviction for a capital crime could be ameliorated
by benefit of clergy in at least some colonies.181 This procedure, of course,
PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY 133 (Boston, T.B. Wait & Co. 1814); money, id. at 238,
241, 340, 344, 420, 468, 469, 470, 596, 597; and goods seized by impost officers, id. at 574.
The remaining four consist of: forfeiture of money for falsely sounding an alarm by firing a
gun, id. at 343; a non-responsive reference to forfeiture where the reference to weapons is
in a different act on the same page, id. at 574; the reference discussed supra note 176 and
accompanying text; and the reference discussed infra note 178. The term “gun” or “guns”
appears ten times, none of which is relevant. See id. at 133 (forfeiture of money for trading
with Indians); id. at 162 (directions for mounting of artillery); id. at 163 (monetary fine for
shooting guns in false alarm); id. at 190 (monetary fine for masters of ships or seamen
shooting gun after daylight or on the sabbath); id. at 261 (militia ownership of guns); id. at
266 (firing guns to sound an alarm); id. at 343 (fine for shooting gun after sunset, other
than for an alarm or “necessary defense”); id. at 734 (providing weapons instruction for
youths); id. at 802 (providing mandatory weapons ownership in an act for reinforcement of
the army); id. at 804 (authorizing the paid appropriation of private arms to support the
army).
178
An Act for Preventing and Suppressing of Riots, Routs, and Unlawful Assemblies
(1751), ch. 239, § 1, reprinted in THE CHARTERS AND GENERAL LAWS OF THE COLONY AND
PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY 574, 575 (Boston, T.B. Wait & Co. 1814).
179
Id. According to an electronic search of the version of the text published in The
Making of Modern Law: Primary Sources, Gale Cengage Learning (visited May 6, 2020),
the only two references to “pistol” are in statutes involving dueling, referenced supra note
176 and infra note 228 and accompanying text.
180 Marshall, supra note 22, at 710–11 (footnote omitted).
181
See, e.g., United States v. Browning, 24 F. Cas. 1276, 1277 (C.C.D.D.C. 1806)
(describing an indictment for “stealing a tub of butter” as “charg[ing] a felony, and by the
laws of Virginia, as they existed prior to 1796, its punishment was death, with the benefit
of clergy”); State v. Pompey, 2 Del. Cas. 113, 113 (Quar. Sess. 1798) (summary of counsel’s
argument stating, “I have no doubt you will from the evidence find him guilty of
manslaughter, which crime by our Act of Assembly entitles him to benefit of clergy or Act of
Assembly, and, if he does, the court cannot hang him, but burn in the hand and imprison
him six months.”); State v. Gray, 5 N.C. 147, 147 (1806) (“No reason can at this day exist,
why Females shall not be entitled to the benefit of Clergy, as well as Males.”); LAFAVE ET
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seems bizarre from the contemporary perspective. But, in any case, it
contemplated mitigation of the consequences of a capital conviction
through a process involving, among other things, burning, branding or
otherwise marking a convict’s thumb—in general, benefit of clergy was
available only once,182 and the marking provided some evidence of
that183—and a mitigated sentence, which could necessitate provision of a
peace bond. For example, one opinion states, “Many persons have been
admitted to the benefit of clergy in Maryland, and burnt in the hand
. . . .”184 One granted benefit of clergy was subject to a range of alternative
punishments, including, among others, imprisonment for a term, a
requirement to post a bond for good behavior and, for convictions in
England, “transportation”185 to colonial America or another a colony.186
This author has searched in vain for any reference in the English
authority Chitty to a collateral consequence involving a permanent
forfeiture of firearms rights—or, in fact, any forfeiture of firearms rights at
all, except as might be necessitated in order to obtain a temporary bond.187

supra note 160, § 1.6(b) (referencing “the ready availability of benefit of clergy in some
colonies for first-offenders convicted of capital crimes”); Marshall, supra note 22, at 715
(briefly discussing benefit of clergy).
182
People v. Youngs, 1 Cai. 37, 39 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1803) (summary of counsel’s
argument, stating, “In England, the second conviction is not availed of in the indictment;
but when the prisoner claims the benefit of his clergy, it is counterpleaded.” (emphasis
removed)); 1 CHITTY, supra note 147, at 675 (referencing a single use for persons not in holy
orders; clergy allowed the benefit “as often as they may need it”).
183 1 CHITTY, supra note 147, at 669.
184
United States v. Norris, 27 F. Cas. 187, 188 (C.C.D.C. 1807) (opinion of Cranch,
C.J.).
185
See generally 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 508
(John Curwood ed., 8th ed. London, S. Sweet 1824) (stating, as to exile or transportation,
and “send[ing] a subject of England . . . out of the land,” “After the establishment of English
colonies in America, therefore, it became in this country, as in all others which have had
colonies, the most common sentence of criminals.”).
186 Chitty notes that a the end of the seventeenth century, for those granted benefit of
clergy, “court[s] were authorized to commit the offenders to the house of correction, for any
time not less than six months nor exceeding two years . . . .” 1 CHITTY, supra note 147, at
672. The alternatives were subsequently expanded to include for some crimes “the offender
to be transported for seven years to America, which has been since altered to any part of
his majesty's colonies.” Id. at 673; see generally id. at 711–15 (generally discussing the
judicially-imposed punishments for clergyable offenses); id. at 714–15 (identifying specific
illustrations, including in one case incarceration for a year and sureties for good behaviour
for seven years; and, in another, imprisonment for two years, followed by an obligation to
provide sureties for good behavior for three years, in addition to the pillory and a fine).
187
According to an electronic search of the text using interface provided by The
Making of Modern Law: Legal Treatises 1800-1926 database (Gale Cengage Learning), the
book has no responsive information (no reference to forfeiture of firearms, specifically, as
revealed by searches for pages with the words with the stem “forfeit” within 90 words of
any word with any of the following stems: arm, firearm, musket or weapon. In specific, the
searches were: chitty and (forfeit* n90 arm*); chitty and (forfeit* n90 firearm*); chitty and
(forfeit* n90 gun); chitty and (forfeit* n90 musket*); chitty and (forfeit* n90 weapon*). The
AL,
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D. Kates’ Historical Recitation Is Unpersuasive
Above, this Part has addressed why two of the referenced snippets of
historical conceptualizations—(i) the historical linking of a virtuous
citizenry and the need for a militia and (ii) forfeitures imposed on persons
sentenced to death—are insufficient to conclude there was an implied limit
on the Second Amendment’s scope in the Founding Era that necessitates
validation of permanent felon firearms bans that are incongruous with
contemporary constitutional norms applied elsewhere. We can now
address the third historical justification: Kates’ fragmentary recitation of
some Founding-Era proposals.
Kates, whose seminal work has been relied upon by initial authority
treating felon bans following Heller, further urges that the Second
Amendment does not benefit persons with prior felony convictions, by
referencing certain Founding-Era state proposals. He writes:
Felons simply did not fall within the benefits of the common law
right to possess arms. That law punished felons with automatic
forfeiture of all goods, usually accompanied by death. . . . Nor does
it seem that the Founders considered felons within the common
law right to arms or intended to confer any such right upon them.
All the ratifying convention proposals which most explicitly
detailed the recommended right-to-arms amendment excluded
criminals and the violent.188
One can quickly identify numerous concerns with reliance on the
authority Kates identifies as a basis to support his conclusions:189 it
identifies only a few provisions; even this limited number did not all
garner majority support; and the collection omits other Founding-Era
proposals supporting the opposite conclusion.
Kates ultimately references the following proposals, a majority of
which do not involve exclusions for non-dangerous persons, and only one of
which he identifies as having garnered majority support from a state
convention—one that excluded persons for engaging in “actual rebellion”:
(i) a proposal from New Hampshire recommending a federal bill of
rights allowing disarmament of “any citizen . . . as are or have been in
actual rebellion;”190
following additional restriction was incorporated in each search (to exclude from the search
other works): and Year of Publication: 1816.
188
Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second
Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 266 (1983).
189
See generally Joseph G.S. Greenlee, The Historical Justification for Prohibiting
Dangerous Persons from Possessing Arms, 20 Wyo. L. Rev. 249, 275 (2020) (“Kates’s
article, however, provides no meaningful support for the theory.”).
190 Kates, supra note 188, at 222 (quoting 1 JONATHAN ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL
STATE CONVENTIONS 326 (2d ed. 1836)).
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(ii) a proposal from a “rump” of the Pennsylvania delegates
approving the federal constitution—a proposal that would have
prohibited “disarming the people or any of them unless for crimes
committed, or real danger of public injury from individuals;”191 and
(iii) a proposal from Sam Adams limiting protected firearms rights
to “peaceable citizens.”192
A Founding-Era proposal allowing disarmament of persons who have been
“in actual rebellion” is completely different from wholesale disarmament,
post-sentence, of all persons who have committed serious crimes, whether
involving physical force or not.
Moreover, Kates’ listing is not complete, at least insofar as his
reference to proposals that “most explicitly detailed the recommended
right-to-arms amendment excluded criminals and the violent”193 is not
understood as a linguistic sham. Nicholas Johnson and co-authors note:
(i) Virginia proposed amendments that included, inter alia, “That
the people have a right to keep and bear arms; that a well regulated
militia composed of the body of the people trained to arms, is the
proper, natural, and safe defence of a free state.”194
(ii) New York’s ratification message included, inter alia, a
statement “That the people have a right to keep and bear arms; that a
well regulated militia, including the body of the people capable of
bearing arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a free
state.”195
(iii) North Carolina’s resolution of proposed amendments provided
a declaration of rights including in pertinent part, “That the people
have a right to keep and bear arms; that a well regulated militia,
composed of the body of the people, trained to arms, is the proper,
natural, and safe defence of a free state . . . .”196
(iv) Rhode Island’s ratification message included in pertinent part,
“That the people have a right to keep and bear arms; that a well
regulated militia, including the body of the people capable of bearing
arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a free state . . . .”197
191 Id. at 222 (emphasis removed) (quoting 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 665 (1971)). This proposal was rejected. NICHOLAS J. JOHNSON ET
AL., FIREARMS LAW AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT: REGULATION, RIGHTS, AND POLICY 310 (2d
ed. 2018).
192
Id. at 222 at 222 (quoting SCHWARTZ, supra note 191, at 675). This proposal was
rejected. JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 191, at 312.
193 See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
194 JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 191, at 322.
195 Id. at 325.
196 Id. at 327.
197 Id. at 328.
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None of these has an express exclusion for dangerous persons or persons
with prior felony convictions.
Insofar as Kates’ exclusion of these proposals was conscious, and then
styled as limiting his sample to “explicitly detailed” proposals, that would
be a sham, disguising the fact that the sampling process ab initio excludes
proposals that do not support his conclusion. Those that do not support his
conclusion are naturally written with phrasing he appears to classify as
not “explicitly detailed.” So indeed, 100% of enactments and proposals
having language used in a carve-out—a carve-out treating criminals, postsentence worse—have carve-outs. But that does not mean those without
carve-outs ought to be disregarded, because they do not have carve-outs
and, therefore, are not “explicitly detailed.”

E. Actual Founding-Era Limits
The intellectual foundation for concluding those with any prior felony
convictions are outside the scope of those who benefit from the Second
Amendment, as we have shown, relies on assuming a broad class of
persons was, in the Founding Era, deprived of firearms rights, without any
direct authority whatsoever.198
Let us then review the actual Founding-Era prohibitions. This author
is not aware of analogous Founding-Era federal prohibitions.199 One might
be inclined to stop there. For example, there were religious restrictions on
holding office in South Carolina under its 1778 constitution,200 and the
state established “The Christian Protestant religion” as “the established
religion of this State.”201 So, some caution is necessary before concluding
an enumerated right protected by the Bill of Rights was subject to an
198
It may be that courts have concluded post-sentence restrictions on violent felons
must be available, and have simply settled on the most plausible rationale that has come to
their attention—albeit one that is over-inclusive. The following perhaps highlights the
relevant concern:
For example, if the operative clause recognizes an individual right to possess and
carry in case of confrontation all firearms in common civilian use, then there would
seemingly be no textual basis to deprive some individuals of that right on the basis
of a prior conviction or mental illness or to prevent individuals from exercising the
right to carry firearms if concealed or in “sensitive places.” While there may be good
policy reasons for such regulations, Heller states that “[c]onstitutional rights are
enshrined with the scope they were understood to have when the people adopted
them, whether or not future legislatures or (yes) even future judges think that scope
too broad.” In this fashion, Heller’s originalism breaks down.
Rosenthal, supra note 35, at 1194 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570,
634–35 (2008)).
199
Marshall describes 1689 religion-based exclusions from firearms rights in England
as, “the closest thing in the historical record, before World War I, to direct support for
disarming felons.” Marshall, supra note 22, at 721.
200
See S.C. CONST. OF 1778, arts. III, XII, XIII, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/
18th_century/sc02.asp#1.
201 Id. art. XXXVII.
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implicit exception merely because one can point to an idiosyncratic state
restriction in the Founding Era.202
However, were one inclined to turn to state restrictions, it would
appear there were not state restrictions comparable to the current federal
felon prohibition. The closest state prohibitions that come to this author’s
attention, which are not comparable, include:
•
•
•

Some provisions disarming “persons who refused to swear an oath
of allegiance to the state or to the nation;”203 and
More generally, restrictions and “law-abiding slaves, free blacks,
and Loyalists”204 —and other inapposite restrictions adopted in the
shadow of the Revolutionary War;205 and
Assorted circumstances under which dangerous persons might be
required to post bonds.206

The third-listed mechanism is patently the most relevant. But let us
first examine, in brief, the others. Lack of loyalty to one’s government, and
adhering to governments in opposition, in temporal proximity to the
American Revolution, is qualitatively different from permanently
disarming all persons who had previously committed any serious crimes.
This historical analogue involves different classes of disarmed persons, it
is much more narrow in scope, and it involves addressing misconduct
involving harm to the core governance structure.
Rosenthal asserts, “Although, as Heller noted, framing-era regulation
was limited, it was not insignificant. Classes of individuals such as slaves,
202
See generally Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 247–48 (1833) (“If these
propositions be correct, the fifth amendment must be understood as restraining the power
of the general government, not as applicable to the states. In their several constitutions,
they have imposed such restrictions on their respective governments, as their own wisdom
suggested; such as they deemed most proper for themselves. It is a subject on which they
judge exclusively, and with which others interfere no further than they are supposed to
have a common interest.”).
203 Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. ATF, 700 F.3d 185, 200 (5th Cir. 2012).
204 Id. at 200. See also JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 191, at 280 (“American Tories who
fought for the crown could be disarmed without compensation pursuant to the laws of war. .
. . After the war was over, . . . [a]s for the former Loyalists or neutrals who stayed in the
United States, there were no legal restrictions on their acquisition of arms.” A note asks
the extent to which this informs the understanding of the Second Amendment. Id. See also
Marshall, supra note 22, at 723–24 (discussing treatment by the Continental Congress of
persons “notoriously disaffected to the cause of America,” and similar treatment in assorted
colonies). See generally Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 65, at 244 (“[T]here is simply no
tradition—from 1791 or 1866—of prohibiting gun possession . . . for people convicted of
misdemeanors or subject to civil protective orders. The colonies and then the states
certainly knew how to ban firearms possession for people who were considered dangerous
(namely, slaves and Indians”).).
205
See Greenlee, supra note 189, at 264–65 (discussing colonial restrictions adopted
during the Revolutionary War applicable to “notoriously disaffected to the cause of
America” and other restrictions of a similar scope).
206 See JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 191, at 379–81 (discussing bonds).
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freed blacks, and people of mixed race were frequently prohibited from
owning or carrying guns, and some states extended this bar to Catholics or
whites unwilling to swear allegiance to the Revolution.”207 One should
think it self-evidently unsatisfactory to rely on manifestations of
Founding-Era racial or religious discrimination and intolerance as a basis
for justifying a contemporary treatment of other classes of persons.208
Rosenthal notes, “The prophylactic regulations of the framing era
utilized proxies for dangerousness that we would today find wildly
inaccurate, if not profoundly offensive, such as religion, race, and political
loyalty.”209 Rosenthal, however, elides the most salient Founding-Era
“prophylactic regulations”210—use of bonds of limited duration.
Donald Braman writes:
In colonial America, many formal and informal sanctions
focused attention on the claims that others in the community had
on the offender. The most typical forms of punishment were fines,
the posting of bond, and sureties, with shaming, corporal
punishment, banishment, and the death penalty also employed,
though less frequently.211
Some basic principles governing bonds are set forth in a Founding-Era
treatise, sometimes referenced as Burn’s Justice or Burns’s Justice,212 that
Rosenthal, supra note 35, at 1210.
State v. Newsom, 27 N.C. 250 (1844), provides an illustration of the use of a
historical restriction at the time of a constitutional provision’s adoption as giving rise to an
implicit limit. The case involves a challenge to a statute that required free blacks to obtain
a license or keep at their houses or to carry. Id. at 250 (headnote). As to its compatibility
with a state constitutional provision that protected firearms rights “for the defence of the
state,” id. at 253–54, the court in sum concludes the constitutional right was subject to an
implicit limit derived from longstanding racial discrimination:
And, while we acknowledge the solemn obligations to obey the constitution, as well
in spirit as in letter, we at the same time hold, that nothing should be interpolated
into that instrument, which the people did not will. We are not at liberty to give an
artificial and constrained interpretation to the language used, beyond its ordinary,
popular and obvious meaning. Before, and at the time our constitution was framed,
there was among us this class of people, and they were subjected to various
disabilities, from which the white population was exempt. It is impossible to
suppose, that the framers of the Bill of Rights did not have an eye to the existing
state of things, and did not act with a full knowledge of the mixed population, for
whom they were legislating.
Id. at 254. So, a contemporary justification for restricting firearms rights eerily mimicks
the odious path previously used to justify racial restrictions on firearms possession.
209 Rosenthal, supra note 35, at 1215.
210 See id. at 1190 n.23 (containing a sole use of a word having “bond” as its stem in the
name of a cited article).
211 Braman, supra note 160, at 1168–69 (footnotes omitted).
212
Bradstreet v. Furgeson, 17 Wend. 181, 187 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837) (“Most of the law
upon the subject of ‘surety for the peace,’ and for ‘good behavior,’ will be found in Burns’s
Justice, a book of the highest authority in these matters . . . .”).
207
208
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was published in multiple editions under various authors.213 The
requirements in the Founding Era for a “surety for the peace” or a “surety
for the good behaviour,” two different types of sureties, are relevant. These
provided nested restrictions—a surety for good behaviour subsumed the
conduct covered by a surety for the peace.214
The mechanics governing these two types of bonds were similar,215 but
not identical. The individual obligated to obtain the bond would need to
arrange for one or more persons to provide sureties—persons who would
forfeit money if the covered person committed some act during the bond’s
term. Often in the discretion of the justice,216 the surety could have been
for a term,217 or it could have been for the covered person’s life.218 The
justice also had discretion in setting number of sureties, and the amount of
the bond.219 If the ordered surety could not be obtained, the individual was
subject to imprisonment.220
This process may have restricted firearms rights in two ways. First,
there could have been an indirect impact. A review of the 1801 successor
edition of Burn’s Justice has not revealed the actual considerations of
persons acting as sureties. However, one should think that one acting as
surety might only be a surety for a physically dangerous person were the
covered person’s access to arms restricted.221 This would be consistent with
an article referenced above,222 in which Braman writes:
A common combination of both formal and informal sanction was
the assessing of bonds of surety for good behavior against the
properties of the defendant and two members of the community
willing to speak on the defendant’s behalf. These bonds of surety,
which friends pledged to pay if the offender did not maintain his

E.g., Mathew Carey, Preface to THE CONDUCTOR GENERALIS: OR, THE OFFICE, DUTY
AUTHORITY OF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE (Philadelphia, Charless, Printer 1801)
[hereinafter CONDUCTOR GENERALIS] (“The prefent work was compiled from Burn’s Juftice,
previous to the late revolution; and was favoured with a very high degree of public
approbation . . . .”).
214
CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 213, at 335 (“[T]he good behaviour include[ed]
the peace . . . .”).
215 CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 213, at 335.
216
CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 213, at 332 (“[I]t may be regulated by the
difcretion of fuch juftice, both as to the number and fufficiency of the fureties, and the
largenefs of the fum, and the continuance of the time for which the party fhall be bound.”).
See also infra note 229 (referencing judicial discretion to set a term of a peace bond
following a conviction for dueling).
217 See supra note 216.
218 CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 213, at 332.
219 CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 213, at 332.
220 CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 213, at 331.
221 Marshall, supra note 22, at 718–19.
222 See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
213
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good behavior, helped draw the community into the policing of the
offender.223
Braman quotes a text as stating, “The two sureties required from
neighbors, friends, or superiors to pressure the defendant to keep his
pledge show that in deterrence, as in arrest and trial, the criminal justice
system of the county depended upon the active assistance of the
community.”224

Second, there was a direct restriction that appears less prominently
identified. Although a bond for the peace would not be forfeited absent
battery or affray, a bond on good behavior expressly limited some forms of
weapons possession: “[T]he good behavior may be forfeited by the number
of people a man has, and by their harnefs, or weapons, and the like, altho’
they break not the peace.”225 So, to be clear, there were Founding-Era
provisions directly regulating firearms possession of persons considered
physically dangerous, but they were not triggered automatically to impose
a permanent ban on all persons who had ever committed any serious
crime.
Illustrations of Use of Bonds for Founding-Era Analogues. We have
above noted that bonds were used in the Founding Era to restrict
dangerous behavior of criminals, post-incarceration for some crimes. Let
us now turn to providing illustrations of some of the crimes for which they
were used.
Some of circumstances that would have justified requiring bonds for
good behavior226 would not seem to be a suitable basis to impose any
restriction modernly. But bonds were used to address, for example,
domestic violence and sexual assault.227 A Massachusetts act imposed,
Braman, supra note 160, at 1169 n.93.
Braman, supra note 160, at 1169 n.93 (quoting AM. HISTORICAL ASS’N, AMERICAN
LEGAL RECORDS: CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA, at ix, lxxi (Peter Charles
Hoffer & William B. Scott eds., 1984)).
225
CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 213, at 337. That text later states that a bond
for good behavior is forfeited “for going armed with great numbers to the terror of the
people, or fpeaking words tending to fedition,” identifying these acts as ones not triggering
forfeiture of a surety of the peace. Id. at 346.
226
See CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 213, at 342–43 (“[P]erfons of ill behaviour,
or evil of fame or report generally, or that fhall keep company with any fuch, or with any
other fufpicious perfon in the night[;] ... Sufpected perfons who live idly, and yet fare well,
or are well apparelled, having nothing whereon to live; unlefs upon examination they fhall
give a good account of fuch their living[;] . . . [the author of] a writing full of obfcene
ribaldry, without any kind of reflection upon anyone, . . . as a fcandalous perfon of evil
fame.”).
227 William Nelson states, for example, “[C]ourts required men who beat their wives to
enter into peace bonds . . . .” William E. Nelson, Law and the Structure of Power in Colonial
Virginia, 48 VAL. U. L. REV. 757, 795 (2014). A 1761 Massachusetts act states that
theretofore, conviction of “assaulting or offering any violence or insolence to any woman or
woman kind in the fields, streets or lanes in any town, or of despoiling them[, etc.],” was to
223
224
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inter alia, a bond requirement on one convicted of dueling—the required
bond term being changed in the first part of the eighteenth century to one
year228 from “for so long a time as the . . . court shall judge reasonable.”229
Posting a bond was, in fact, the ultimate consequence in Sir John Knight’s
Case,230 the seminal case addressing the seventeenth-century treatment of
one who “with evil intent”231 traveled with arms to terrify the people.
Joseph Greenlee provides additional illustrations, including a three-year
prohibition on bearing arms for treason in connection with Shays’s
Rebellion.232

F. Modern Overcriminalization Having No Founding-Era Analogue
Blocher and Miller note, “Unless courts construe Founding-era
regulations at a higher level of abstraction, shorten the length of time for
regulations to be considered long-standing, or both, few modern
regulations will find indisputable support in Founding-era law.”233 The
contemporary federal firearms ban extends to some convictions for, for
example, (i) driving while intoxicated234 and (ii) false alteration of
government documentation allowing tinted vehicle windows, to extend it
to a different vehicle.235 The brief authority Kates cites236 simply does not
support the proposition, and does not provide a basis to conclude, it was
intended in the Founding Era that firearms rights would be forfeited for
activity equivalent to these illustrations.
It is not this article’s purpose to assemble a comprehensive
compilation of the relevant Founding Era illustrations. Let us, instead,
turn to an example.

be publicly whipped or incarcerated for 30 days and to “find sureties for the good behavior
before he be discharged.” Act of 1761, ch. 288, reprinted in THE CHARTERS AND GENERAL
LAWS OF THE COLONY AND PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY 644, 644 (Boston, T.B. Wait &
Co. 1814).
228
Act of 1729/1730, ch. 172, § 1, reprinted in THE CHARTERS AND GENERAL LAWS OF
THE COLONY AND PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY 470–71 (Boston, T.B. Wait & Co. 1814).
229
Act for the Punishing and Preventing of Dueling (1716), ch. 131, § 2, reprinted in
THE CHARTERS AND GENERAL LAWS OF THE COLONY AND PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY
422, 423 (Boston, T.B. Wait & Co. 1814).
230
Sir John Knight’s Case, (1686) 87 Eng. Rep. 75, 76 n.a (K.B.), additional
proceedings at (1686) 90 Eng. Rep. 330 (K.B.).
231 The opinion references actions “malo animo,” Sir John Knight’s Case, 90 Eng. Rep.
at 330 (emphasis added), defined in JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 191, at 96, as “[w]ith evil
intent; with malice.”
232 Greenlee, supra note 189, at 268–69.
233
Blocher & Miller, supra note 34, at 328 (footnote omitted). See generally Marshall,
supra note 22, at 697 (stating, “The need is particularly acute given the cancerous growth
since the 1920s of ‘regulatory’ crimes punishable by more than a year in prison, as distinct
from traditional common-law crimes.”).
234 See supra notes 82, 94 and accompanying text.
235 See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
236 See supra note 190–192 and accompanying text.

46

Barondes-firearms-virtuous-accepted.docx

There is a federal prohibition on various types of insider trading in
securities,237 for which willful violators are criminally punishable with up
to twenty years imprisonment.238 A 2012 act expressly provides that
members of Congress and employees of Congress are not excluded from the
prohibition.239 A conviction will give rise to a permanent firearms
prohibition under some state law,240 and the theory generally excluding
the non-virtuous from the Second Amendment would not invalidate this
prohibition. It also may give rise to a permanent federal felon
prohibition—there is limited authority as to whether it would be within
the exception in the federal ban for commission of certain business
practice crimes.241
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116–91).
15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a).
239
Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012 (STOCK ACT), Pub. L. No.
112–105, § 4, 126 Stat. 291, 292 (2012) (“(a) AFFIRMATION OF NONEXEMPTION.—
Members of Congress and employees of Congress are not exempt from the insider trading
prohibitions arising under the securities laws, including section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b–5 thereunder.”).
240 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
241
One case holds securities fraud, arising from with false filings with the Securities
and Exchange Commission, is within the exception. Reyes v. Sessions, 342 F. Supp. 3d 141,
144, 156 (D.D.C. 2018). See supra note 52. It concluded the common theme identifying
crimes within the exclusion is they are “commercial crimes intended to address economic
harm to competitors or consumers.” Id. at 150. However, it would appear that the purposes
of this act are, rather, to assure “clean” government. The report on the act states:
The Committee nonetheless concluded that it is of the utmost importance for the
American people to have full confidence that all Members of Congress act to serve
the American people rather than their own financial interests. It therefore reported
S. 2038 to establish a clear policy that insider trading will not be tolerated within
the halls of Congress, and to ensure that any instances of insider trading by
Members or their staff will be subject to the same civil and criminal laws that apply
to everyone else.
S. Rep. 112–244, at 2–3 (2012).
Dicta in another case would indicate not. United States v. Geyler, 932 F.2d 1330, 1336
n.9 (9th Cir. 1991) (suggesting federal convictions for “mail fraud or securities fraud” are
outside the exception), abrogated on other grounds by Beecham v. United States, 511 U.S.
368 (1994).
In any case, there has been no suggestion that an exception from felon prohibition for
securities fraud or insider trading is constitutionally required. The Ninth Circuit, for
example, vaguely implies that only much less serious crimes than insider trading or
securities fraud are in jeopardy of being too insignificant for the Second Amendment to
allow them to be predicate offenses for a permanent firearms ban. United States v. Phillips,
827 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2016), notes:
Our holding does not address, however, the question of whether there are limits
on Congress’s and the States’ ability to define any old crime as a felony and thereby
use it as the basis for a § 922(g)(1) conviction, consistent with the Second
Amendment. . . . Can Congress or the States define petty larceny as a felony? Of
course. Can a conviction for stealing a lollipop then serve as a basis under
§ 922(g)(1) to ban a person for the rest of his life from ever possessing a firearm,
consistent with the Second Amendment? That remains to be seen.
Id. at 1176 n.5.
237
238
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One supposes the founders would not have thought this type of
activity equivalent of a capital crime—sufficiently egregious to deprive one
of firearms rights. Why so? Because it was apparently practiced by
intimates of the founders themselves.
Bowers discusses insider trading on Revolutionary War debt—debt
that became much more valuable on its assumption by the federal
government.242 Bowers notes Alexander Hamilton’s role in this
speculation: “In all this, Hamilton had no part and no responsibility
beyond having made indiscrete disclosures of which his friends availed
themselves, through buying and selling through his agents in New York
and Philadelphia for his brother-in-law.” To express the principle in
language parallel to that used in Medina v. Whitaker:243 With this
perspective, it is difficult to conclude that the public, in 1791, would have
understood someone who participated in acts of the type committed by
intimates of founders, with Alexander Hamilton’s indiscrete assistance, to
be outside the scope of those entitled to possess arms.
G. Conclusion
Our brief review of the Founding-Era restrictions on criminals’
firearms possession, post sentence, has revealed restrictions that are not
analogous the contemporary firearms bans imposed on persons with prior
felony convictions. The Founding-Era restrictions were tailored—their
term varies depending on the nature of the crimes. That is in contrast to
the current federal restrictions (and some state restrictions) that, absent
reinstatement, are generally permanent244 and, other than for the
wholesale exclusion of some business practices crimes, are independent of
whether the prior activity is associated with any threat of future violence.
The scholarly fount of the jurisprudential position that the Second
Amendment does not benefit those who have previously committed
“serious” crimes and are therefore not “virtuous” relies on a censored
sampling of Founding-Era documents. It equates all serious crimes with
crimes for which the defendant was subject to capital punishment,
although that was not the case in the Founding Era. The historical context
in which the Second Amendment was adopted is manifestly insufficient to
conclude that a restriction not actually present at the time—that all who
had previously committed serious crimes were excluded from firearms
rights—was implicitly read into its language.

242
See CLAUDE G. BOWERS, JEFFERSON AND HAMILTON: THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY
AMERICA 43–46 (referencing full repayment of debt purchased at discounts of 80% or
more).
243 913 F.3d 152, 158 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“With this perspective, it is difficult to conclude
that the public, in 1791, would have understood someone facing death and estate forfeiture
to be within the scope of those entitled to possess arms.”).
244 See supra notes 32–33, 62 and accompanying text.
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Contemporary courts, then, are not required by the Founding-Era
precedent to exclude the “non-virtuous” from all firearms rights. The
propriety of contemporary judicial reliance on a person not being
“virtuous” as a basis to deprive him or her of firearms rights, then,
depends on that being a valid approach generally, under contemporary
constitutional norms.
The following Part turns to the contemporary judicial reliance on a
person not being virtuous as curtailing some of his or her constitutional
rights. As we shall see, Supreme Court precedent rejects that approach.
Additionally, the almost insignificant number of contemporary cases that
follow that approach use it to support odious outcomes.
VI. CONTEMPORARY CASES REFERENCING THE VIRTUOUS OUTSIDE THE
CONTEXT OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT
A. Case Statistics
To assess the extent to which modern courts have considered a person
being not being “virtuous” in ascertaining the scope of his or her
constitutional rights, the following Westlaw search of opinions was
performed: adv: virtuous & (“rational basis” or “intermediate scrutiny” or
“strict scrutiny”). This revealed a total of 141 opinions. Our data set of
opinions was reduced 245to 138 by omitting three issued before 1969.246
The number of opinions per year is depicted in the following figure,
with the light gray bars showing opinions including the phrase “Second
Amendment” tallied per year (identified as “2A”):

245

This search does not omit cases referencing “non-virtuous” instead of “virtuous.”

See Westlaw search: advanced: (“rational basis” “intermediate scrutiny” “strict scrutiny”) &
non-virtuous % virtuous) (May 22, 2020) (identifying two secondary sources but no cases).
246 The omitted cases are from 1949, 1920 and 1871.
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Figure 1

Number of Opinions by Year and Whether
Reference “Second Amendment"
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Of course, one could use other filters to identify cases that reference
one being virtuous. One could search for cases including “virtue,” which
would involve many irrelevant cases including terms such as “by virtue
of.” Or, one could use different filters to identify those addressing
constitutional issues. Indeed, this investigation involves sampling of
opinions. As long as the filter is not biased—and there is no reason to
suppose that it is—the analysis of the sampled results is designed to
illuminate the general issue.
The annual number of opinions not referencing “Second Amendment”
throughout the fifty-year period varies from zero to four. The first opinion
referencing the Second Amendment occurs in 2006. Starting in about
2010, the typical number of opinions per year increases, with opinions
referencing “Second Amendment” generally outnumbering the others.
An additional initial indication that reference to “virtuous” is used
differently in cases involving the Second Amendment is illuminated by
referencing a discrepancy in frequency with certain Westlaw KeyCite flags
are associated with the opinions. The most adverse indicator, red, is
associated with 11% of the opinions containing “Second Amendment,” and
25% of the other opinions.247 That is, this signal is more than twice as
Westlaw describes a red KeyCite flag as indicating the opinion “is no longer good
law for at least one of the points of law it contains.” Thomson Reuters Westlaw, KeyCite on
Thomson Reuters Westlaw (2016), https://lscontent.westlaw.com/images/content/KeyCite
%20on%20Westlaw.pdf. The yellow flag indicates the opinion “has some negative
treatment.” Id.
247
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common among opinions not containing “Second Amendment” than it is in
opinions containing that phrase.
Figure 2
All Years
No 2A
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2006 and after
No 2A

56

28
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So, at this point, we have: Cases that reference the virtuous
disproportionately involve the Second Amendment, and cases that
reference the virtuous but don’t involve the Second Amendment are more
frequently dubious.
B. Relevant Supreme Court Authority
The raw statistics presented in Part VI.A suggest a qualitative
difference in the extent to which courts rely on whether a person is
“virtuous” in ascertaining the scope of constitutional rights, depending on
whether the Second Amendment is at issue. However, a review of the
analyses of the cases not implicating the Second Amendment, i.e., review
of the opinion language, reveals the variation is more profound. The raw
statistics above, before considering how reference to being “virtuous” is
used in an opinion, overstate reliance on this principle in cases not
involving the Second Amendment. The bulk of them reference the virtuous
or non-virtuous in some inapposite context. So, actual reliance on this
principle, as a basis to curtail an express right, is almost entirely absent
from the sample outside the context of the Second Amendment.
As noted above,248 the contemporary justification for validating
firearms prohibitions arising from any felony convictions, and exempting
them from even as-applied challenge, relies on the notion that absence of
virtue, a consequence of a conviction for a “serious” crime, can work a
forfeiture of a civil right. The relevant Supreme Court authority in the
sample, outside the context of the Second Amendment, however, expressly
rejects that view. So it is not simply that reliance on a person not being
virtuous is more frequently made in cases involving the Second
Amendment. Rather, outside the Second Amendment context, the
Supreme Court expressly rejects the view that these lower courts have
resuscitated in the Second Amendment context.
248

See supra notes 67, 79–81, 94, 98 and accompanying text.
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The Supreme Court case referencing the issue—the constitutional
consequences of not being “virtuous”—that is most prominently reliedupon by other courts since the middle of the last century is Hill v. Texas.249
Hill v. Texas explicitly rejects curtailment of constitutional rights by
virtue of the fact that a person is not “virtuous.”
The case involves a motion to quash an indictment for rape, on the
basis that the selection of grand jurors was infected by racial
discrimination.250 The Court holds that the State failed to rebut the
claimant’s prima facie case of racial discrimination in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause, relying on raw statistics.251 The Court concludes
the defendant might thereafter be indicted and tried, but only under
procedures conforming to constitutional requirements.252
The litigation revealed substantial evidence of the defendant’s having
actually committed the crime.253 Yet the Court ends its opinion with the
following language bearing on the relationship between being virtuous and
benefitting from constitutional protection:
Nor is this Court at liberty to grant or withhold the benefits of
equal protection, which the Constitution commands for all, merely
as we may deem the defendant innocent or guilty. . . . Equal
protection of the laws is something more than an abstract right. It
is a command which the state must respect, the benefits of which
every person may demand. Not the least merit of our
constitutional system is that its safeguards extend to all—the
least deserving as well as the most virtuous.254
316 U.S. 400 (1942).
Id. at 400–01.
251 Id. at 404 (referencing the “continuous omission of [blacks] from the grand jury lists
for so long a period as sixteen years or more”).
252 Id. at 406.
253 The petitioner was convicted of rape. Hill v. State, 157 S.W.2d 369, 370 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1941), rev’d sub nom. Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942). His identity was evidenced
by: (i) a paper documenting his prison discharge being inside a pocket torn from the
offender’s coat during the criminal altercation; (ii) his confession to assault, but a denial of
rape; and (iii) the identification by both the victim and a companion present at, and also
victimized at, the scene. Hill v. State, 157 S.W.2d at 370–71. In addition, four passers-by
saw the final moments of the violent encounter. Id. at 370–71.
The constitutional violation found by the Court, involving the manner in which the
petitioner had been indicted, does not indict the decision-making process of the petit jury’s
finding the petitioner had committed the offense.
254 316 U.S. at 406.
Of course, there is an ebb and flow over time in the norms as to what attributes give
rise to being “virtuous.” A concurring opinion in Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 392
n.4 (1997), cautions against relaxing constitutional restrictions on governmental action on
the basis of changed social norms:
It is always somewhat dangerous to ground exceptions to constitutional
protections in the social norms of a given historical moment. The purpose of the
Fourth Amendment’s requirement of reasonableness “is to preserve that degree of
249
250
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The Court’s reference to a party not being virtuous is not dicta.
Rather, it is part of the analysis yielding the holding.
Additionally, the court uses the term “virtuous” with a meaning
analogous (or somewhat) analogous to the usage in the Founding Era. It
appears related to performance of duties as a citizen—compliance with
law—as opposed to an alternative, more modern, usage referencing lack of
promiscuity.
Lastly, the court follows this approach in a circumstance that
restrains punishment for egregious acts.
The principle was more recently referenced by the Supreme Court in a
concurring opinion in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,255 a case
that follows a similar approach as to the consequences of being virtuous.
In the case, the Court expressly disclaims the notion that a person’s being
virtuous increases his (in that case, its) free speech rights.
The case involves a state statute restricting the scope of corporate
speech rights. In particular, the statute prevented banks and certain
business corporations from making political contributions.256 The
concurring opinion states the following as to the import of any allegation
that media conglomerates would be more virtuous than other business
enterprises:
In terms of Massachusetts’ other concern, the interests of
minority shareholders, I perceive no basis for saying that the
managers and directors of the media conglomerates are more or
less sensitive to the views and desires of minority shareholders
than are corporate officers generally. Nor can it be said, even if
relevant to First Amendment analysis—which it is not—that the
former are more virtuous, wise, or restrained in the exercise of
corporate power than are the latter.257
C. Apt References to Virtuous Persons in Contemporary Lower-Court
Jurisprudence Citing a Scrutiny Standard
Introduction. Review of the lower-court authority identified in our
search of opinions reveals the following pattern:
•

Some lower-court authority relies on the principle expressed in
Hill v. Texas in discussions finding Equal Protection violations—in

respect for the privacy of persons and the inviolability of their property that existed
when the provision was adopted—even if a later, less virtuous age should become
accustomed to considering all sorts of intrusion ‘reasonable.’”
Id. (quoting Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 380 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
255 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
256 435 U.S. at 793 (majority opinion).
257 435 U.S. at 797 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
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•

favor of unwed mothers (as to educational opportunities),258 aliens
(as to educational opportunities),259 and motor vehicle guests (as to
claim limitation under guest statutes);260 and
Other lower-court authority limits introduction of evidence of a
crime victim’s attributes, as implicitly casting a criminal
defendant in a poor light, ultimately founded on principles of the
Eighth Amendment and that “[t]he law exists to protect all persons
equally.”261

Of course, all this authority highlights that Second Amendment rights are
treated adversely, in comparison with the treatment of other enumerated
rights.
A reference to being non-virtuous as a basis for curtaining rights
bleeds into a few contemporary cases through citation to noncontemporary cases that rely on that mode of analysis, in language or in a
context that is contrary to contemporary norms.262 Excluding those cases,
the entire scope of contemporary authority, not referencing the term
“Second Amendment,” relying on a person not being virtuous as a basis for
curtailing rights, is apparently limited to the following three illustrations:
•

258
259
260

authority upholding criminalization of sexual contact between
persons of the same gender;263
See infra notes 270–Error! Bookmark not defined. and accompanying text.
See infra notes 274–278 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 279–284 and accompanying text.

261
State v. Williams, 550 A.2d 1172, 1203 (N.J. 1988). A number of contemporary
cases from New Jersey examine whether the fact that a crime victim was virtuous can be
introduced. Oliver v. Hendricks, No. CIV.A. 04–4219 (JAG), 2006 WL 1540823, at *1, *5–6
(D.N.J. May 31, 2006); State v. Muhammad, 678 A.2d 164, 179 (N.J. 1996); State v. Erazo,
594 A.2d 232, 258 (N.J. 1991) (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); State
v. Cooper, Nos. A–2011–12T1, A–2988–12T1, A–3099–12T, 2014 WL 11072007, at *16 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 4, 2015). Williams is not included in the sample because it does
not include “rational basis,” “strict scrutiny” or “intermediate scrutiny.”
262
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237, 241 n.8
(1985) (quoting prior authority stating, the “pueblo Indians . . . are a peaceable,
industrious, intelligent, honest, and virtuous people.” (quoting United States v. Joseph, 94
U.S. 614, 616 (1876)); Barbara A. v. John G., 193 Cal. Rptr. 422 (Ct. App. 1983) (discussing
the abolished cause of action for seduction as, “The old action for seduction required that
the woman was ‘. . . chaste and virtuous at the time of the alleged seduction ...’, and it was
used primarily to protect young, inexperienced women who had succumbed to the sexual
advances of older men.” (quoting Briggs v. Stroud, 126 P.2d 409, 413 (Cal. Ct. App. 1942));
Roundtree v. United States, 581 A.2d 315, 335 n.17 (D.C. 1990) (Schwelb, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (quoting an earlier opinion as follows: “[W]ill you not more
readily infer assent in the practiced Messalina, in loose attire, than in the reserved and
virtuous Lucretia?” (quoting People v. Abbot, 19 Wend. 192, 195 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838));
State v. Rundlett, 391 A.2d 815, 820 & n.17 (Me. 1978), (including in a collection of cases
that it describes as having “prior chastity was an element of the offense” of statutory rape,
one statute requiring the victim be “[o]f previous chaste and virtuous character.” (quoting
1895 Okla. Sess. Laws 104)).
263 See infra notes 285–295 and accompanying text.
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•
•

criminalization of heterosexual, consensual oral sex;264 and
ancillary judicial ruminations by Judge Easterbrook, in a
concurring opinion, concerning treatment of prisoners.265

Lastly, a number of cases identified in the text-based opinion search
that do not reference “Second Amendment” are inapposite to our inquiry.
Those cases address being “virtuous,” where the reference does not concern
whether being virtuous influences the extent to which one benefits from a
constitutional right.
In particular, a number of cases address defining the scope of those
beliefs that are religious and, therefore, within the protection of the
Religion Clauses.266 That authority addresses what is the protected
conduct, rather than who benefits.
264
265
266

See infra notes 296–298 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 299–306 and accompanying text.
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the Supreme Court addresses what is

protected by the Religion Clauses. stating, “A way of life, however virtuous and admirable,
may not be interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of education if it is based
on purely secular considerations . . . .” Id. at 215. A large number of the cases collected in
the text search of opinions quote this language in Yoder. E.g., Moore-King v. Cty. of
Chesterfield, 708 F.3d 560, 571 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215), abrogated
by Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018); Littlefield v.
Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 290 & n.22 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Yoder),
affirming Littlefield v. Forney Ind. Sch. Dist., 108 F. Supp. 2d 681, 699 (N.D. Tex. 2000)
(quoting Yoder); Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Bd. of Educ., 89 F.3d 174, 178 (4th
Cir. 1996) (quoting Yoder), aff’g Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Bd. of Educ., 899 F.
Supp. 1443, 1451 (M.D.N.C. 1995) (quoting Yoder); Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73
F.3d 454, 461 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Yoder); Middleton v. Pan, No. Cv 16–5224–svw (Agr),
2016 WL 11518596, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2016) (quoting Yoder), report and
recommendation adopted, No. CV 16–5224–SVW (AGR), 2017 WL 10543984 (C.D. Cal. July
13, 2017); Whitlow v. California, 203 F. Supp. 3d 1079, 1086 n.3 (S.D. Cal. 2016) (quoting
Yoder); Conner v. Tilton, No. C 07–4965 MMC (PR)b, 2009 WL 4642392, at *14 (N.D. Cal.
Dec. 2, 2009) (quoting Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789, 797–98 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Yoder)), aff’d, 430 F. App’x 617 (9th Cir. 2011); Jensen v. Reeves, 45 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1275
(D. Utah 1999) (quoting Yoder), aff’d, 3 F. App’x 905 (10th Cir. 2001); Shabazz v.
Barnauskas, 600 F. Supp. 712, 724 (M.D. Fla. 1985) (quoting Yoder), aff’d, 790 F.2d 1536
(11th Cir. 1986); Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 448 P.3d 890, 919 (Ariz. 2019)
(quoting Yoder); Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 92
(Cal. 2004); Warner v. City of Boca Raton, 887 So. 2d 1023, 1027 (Fla. 2004) (quoting
Yoder); People v. DeJonge, 501 N.W.2d 127, 135 (Mich. 1993) (quoting Yoder); State v.
Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883, 891 (N.D. 1980) (quoting Yoder); Luken v. Brigano, 797 N.E.2d
1047, 1051 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (quoting Yoder); Larson v. Burmaster, 720 N.W.2d 134,
148 (Wisc. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Yoder); Shannon & Riordan v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals,
451 N.W.2d 479, 486 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1989). It was also quoted in a dissent in a case
reversed on appeal. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688, 701
(9th Cir. 1986) (Beezer, J., dissenting in part), rev’d sub nom. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
Additionally, many cases paraphrase Yoder in terms referencing being “virtuous.”
Birkes v. Mills, No. 03:10–cv–00032–HU, 2011 WL 5117859, at *7 (D. Or. Sept. 28, 2011),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 03:10–CV–32–HU, 2011 WL 5118787 (D. Or. Oct.
25, 2011), vacated, Dec. 16, 2011, and report and recommendation adopted, No. 03:10–CV–
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A few cases reference the need for a virtuous citizenry in supporting
the value of education, either through parenting or as provided by
schools.267 That authority as well does not bear on our issue: Whether
some class of persons, on account of not being virtuous, does not benefit
from a constitutional right. Rather, that authority examines the extent to
which the public at a whole has some right.
Let us exclude (i) cases that make reference to the virtuous or nonvirtuous only through reference to non-contemporary cases relying on that
approach (an offensive character being a unifying theme);268 and (ii) the
ruminations of Judge Easterbrook. That leaves us with only two reported
cases in the last half-century, referencing at least one of three
constitutional standards of scrutiny but not referencing the term “Second
Amendment,” in which a judge relies on persons not being virtuous as a
basis for curtailing civil rights. Each uses “virtuous,” not as is being used
in the Second Amendment context (as was used in the Founding Era), but,
rather, in respect of the extent and nature of sexual activity. And each is
no longer good law. The remainder of this Part VI.C provides some details
of the cases that have been classified as provided in this introduction to
Part VI.B.
32–HU, 2012 WL 930243 (D. Or. Mar. 19, 2012); Monroe v. Commonwealth,
Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 535 A.2d 1222, 1225 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988) (stating,
“And, secular beliefs however virtuous and admirable, of course, do not fall within the
ambit of First Amendment protection.”).
Cochran v. City of Atlanta, 289 F. Supp. 3d 1276 (N.D. Ga. 2017), examines a claim a
governmental employee was fired for publishing a book titled, Who Told You That You
Were Naked?: Overcoming the Stronghold of Condemnation, has as a “goal[]” “to guide men
to live faith-filled, virtuous lives.” Id. at 1282. The court concludes, inter alia, it “not
unreasonable” to conclude the book’s publication would have made it difficult to recruit
LGBT personnel, id. at 1290–91, in dismissing the plaintiff’s free speech retaliation claim.
Id. at 1288, 1291–92. The employee’s position is also discussed in a prior proceeding.
Cochran v. City of Atlanta, 150 F. Supp. 3d 1305, 1308–09 (N.D. Ga. 2015).
267
Perhaps most prominent would be a dissent by Justice Thomas in Brown v.
Entertainment Merchants Ass’n., 564 U.S. 786 (2011). In that case, Justice Thomas
dissents from a holding that the First Amendment invalidates “a state law that prohibits
the direct sale or rental of certain video games to minors because the law ‘abridg[es] the
freedom of speech.’” Id. at 821 (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I). In
support of his view, he asserts, as to the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries:
[I]t was widely accepted that children needed close monitoring and carefully
planned development. . . .
The Revolution only amplified these concerns. The Republic would require
virtuous citizens, which necessitated proper training from childhood. . . .
Based on these views of childhood, the founding generation understood parents
to have a right and duty to govern their children’s growth.
Id. at 827–28.
Our search identified other cases involving access to education. Lake View Sch. Dist.
No. 25 of Phillips Cty. v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 491 (Ark. 2002), supplemented, 189
S.W.3d 1 (Ark. 2004); Milliken v. Green, 212 N.W.2d 711, 718 n.6 (Mich. 1973) (Kavanagh
& Levin, JJ., concurring); Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 393 (Vt. 1997).
268 See supra note 262.
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Equal Protection Cases Following Hill v. Texas. Our search uncovered
three opinions, excluding one reversed on appeal,269 that favorably rely on
the above-quoted principles from Hill v. Texas. Perry v. Grenada
Municipal Separate School District270 involves a challenge, under the
Equal Protection Clause, to a “policy of the school board of denying
admission to unwed mothers.”271 In the introductory paragraph beginning
its Equal Protection analysis, the court concludes by quoting the last two
sentences from Hill v. Texas quoted above.272
The court concludes the policy is unconstitutional. For our purposes,
the relevance of the case is two-fold. First, the court, in relying on Hill,
rejects the notion that not being virtuous results in forfeiture of
constitutional rights. Second, it is not the core of the Founding Era
conceptualization of a virtuous citizen273 that gives rise to putative
potential for classification as non-virtuous but, rather, sexual activity.
Although the more modern references are not limited to sexual activity,
they do seem to be concentrated in supporting views that are peculiar from
the contemporary perspective.

In re Alien Children Education Litigation274 provides a second
illustration of a court quoting Hill v. Texas. The opinion notes:
At issue is a statute which prohibits the use of a state fund to
educate persons who are not citizens of the United States or
“legally admitted aliens.” That statute by negative implication
also permits local school officials to exclude undocumented
children from the public schools.275
This court as well concludes an Equal Protection analysis, which holds
the statute unconstitutional,276 with a paragraph including a quotation
from a portion of Hill v. Texas quoted above.277

269 A fourth opinion quoting Hill, from an intermediate California appellate court, was
reversed on appeal. People v. Guzman, 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d 339 (Ct. App. 2003), rev’d, 107 P.3d
860 (Cal. 2005). The intermediate appellate court holds unconstitutional, as a violation of
Equal Protection, id. at 353, a statutory scheme addressing recidivism, providing better
treatment for those on parole than those on probation. Because the case was reversed on
appeal, it does not comfortably fit in the same class as other contemporary authority
implementing the treatment of the non-virtuous referenced in Hill v. Texas.
270 300 F. Supp. 748 (N.D. Miss. 1969).
271 Id. at 749–50.
272
Id. at 750–51 (quoting Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. at 406) (quoting the last two
sentences quoted supra text accompanying note 254).
273 See supra notes 100–103 and accompanying text.
274
501 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Tex. 1980), aff'd unreported mem. (5th Cir. Feb. 23, 1981),
aff’d sub nom. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
275 Id at 549 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
276 Id. at 584.
277
Id. at 583 (quoting Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. at 406) (quoting the last two sentences
quoted supra text accompanying note 254).
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It is somewhat difficult to contextualize the court’s reference to those
not virtuous. The court notes, “Section 21.031 penalizes children because
of acts committed by their parents,”278 suggesting that insofar as there is
some reference to persons not being virtuous, it would be attributed to the
parents of the adversely affected children. In any case, the pertinent
perspectives illuminated by this opinion are that reference to one not being
virtuous is discredited in ascertaining the scope of constitutional rights.
Our third lower-court case in our data set relying on Hill v. Texas is
McGeehan v. Bunch.279 McGeehan examines the constitutionality of a
guest statute, which prevented recovery by non-paying guests against
their drivers for mere negligence.280 The case addresses “whether or not
[New Mexico’s] guest statute by creating a distinction between paying and
nonpaying automobile guests violates the equal protection clause of the
federal and state constitutions.”281
One justification for the statute that the court examines is to “promote
hospitality, by excluding one who gratuitously provides a ride from suit
based on ordinary negligence,”282 the principle being that “to sue one’s host
for negligence is the epitome of ingratitude.”283 The court rejects the notion
that lack of virtue, in the form of ingratitude, forms a suitable
consideration for elimination of compensation for ordinary negligence. The
opinion adopts the analysis in a student comment, which states in part:
“Moreover, it has been suggested that ‘it is none of the state’s business
what kind of virtuous emotions the citizenry feels or fails to feel.’ Indeed, it
is questionable whether the protection against ingratitude is a permissible
state interest.’”284
In sum, these cases referencing being “virtuous” in ascertaining the
scope of constitutional rights reject the notion that rights are diminished
where one is not virtuous.
Modern Opinions Referencing the Non-Virtuous as Having
Diminished Rights and the Reason to Reject That Authority. There are
some contemporary, or almost-cotemporary, opinions that chart a course
away from the referenced principle expressed in Hill v. Texas. The small
collection of majority opinions at the core are decades old, and reflect
Id. at 572. The court goes on to quote another case to the following effect: “A more
exacting scrutiny of the Texas law also appears warranted when consideration is given to
the decisions of the Supreme Court refusing to penalize and stigmatize children who are
not in a position to prevent the wrongful acts of their parents.” Id. at 573 (quoting Doe v.
Plyler, 458 F. Supp. at 582).
279 540 P.2d 238 (N.M. 1975).
280 Id. at 309.
281 Id. at 239.
282 Id. at 311.
283 Id. at 311–12.
284
Id. at 312 (quoting JoAnn Wierwille, Comment, Review of the Past, Preview of the
Future: The Viability of Automobile Guest Statutes, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 709, 719–20 (1973).
278
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governmental intrusion into private sexual conduct, odious
contemporary standards and rejected by current jurisprudence.

by

Criminalization of Currently Protected Sexual Conduct. Let us turn to
the two almost-contemporary cases that appear directly to reject the Hill
v. Texas principle, i.e., cases that are the intellectual companions of cases
that deny Second Amendment rights to persons deemed non-virtuous. Our
summary illuminates the odious intellectual company kept by opinions
depriving the non-virtuous of the civil right to bear arms.
State v. Walsh,285 a 1986 case, holds that criminalization of “deviate
sexual intercourse with another person of the same sex”286 violates neither
the Equal Protection provisions of the Federal Constitution287 nor the
Missouri Constitution.288 The court notes that, earlier in the year, the
Supreme Court held in Bowers v. Hardwick,289 “[T]he United States
Constitution does not confer upon consenting homosexuals a fundamental
right to engage in sodomy.”290 The Missouri Supreme Court continues,
distinguishing 1980 Pennsylvania authority291 invalidating a statute
prohibiting some intimate activity between unmarried persons:292
We decline to follow the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, because we
believe, to borrow from Mr. Justice Black, “Whether the
legislature takes for its textbook [John Stuart Mill, Thomas
Aquinas or Lord Devlin] or some other is no concern of ours. * * *
[R]elief, if any be needed, lies not with us but with the [General
Assembly].”
We believe further that punishing homosexual acts as a Class
A misdemeanor . . . is rationally related to the State’s
constitutionally permissible objective of implementing and
promoting the public morality.293
The Missouri opinion alters Justice Black’s language, substituting
different “textbooks.”294

713 S.W.2d 508 (Mo. 1986).
Id. at 509 (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 566.090.1(3) (1978), repealed by H.B. 1698,
1236, 995, 1362, 1290, 93rd Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2006)).
287 Id. at 513.
288 Id. at 513.
289 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
290 Walsh, 713 S.W.2d at 511.
291 Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47 (Pa. 1980).
292 Bonadio, 415 A.2d at 94 n.1.
293 713 S.W.2d at 512 (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Ferguson v.
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732 (1963)) (citing THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, pt. I–II,
question 96, art. 2; and PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965)).
294
See Skrupa, 372 U.S. at 732 (referencing “Adam Smith, Herbert Spencer, Lord
Keynes, or some other”).
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The opinion includes reference to the “virtuous” in a footnote quoting
Thomas Aquinas. Insofar applicable to the circumstances the court had
under its consideration, it would indicate the following: It appears the
Missouri Supreme Court deferred to an apparent determination by the
Missouri General Assembly that the prohibited activity was one “from
which the virtuous abstain”: “Now human law is framed for a number of
human beings, the majority of whom are not perfect in virtue. Wherefore
human laws do not forbid all vices, from which the virtuous abstain, but
only the more grievous vices * * * and chiefly those that are to the hurt of
others * * *.”295
In sum, the Missouri Supreme Court’s alteration of Justice Black’s
language provides one of the two somewhat recent cases in our data set,
not referencing “Second Amendment,” referencing persons who putatively
are not virtuous in denying them constitutional protection. It does so in
validating criminalization of consensual homosexual sexual activity.
The second such case is the 2000 case State v. Smith.296 In that case,
the Louisiana Supreme Court rejects the argument that either the Federal
Constitution or the Louisiana Constitution invalidates the criminalization
of heterosexual, consensual oral sex. The opinion announcing the
disposition states, “[T]he defendant would have us announce . . . a
constitutional right to engage in oral sex. This we are unwilling to do.”297
The court, by happenstance, quotes the same language from Ferguson v.
Skrupa that the Missouri Supreme Court quoted fourteen years earlier in
State v. Walsh, similarly altering the quote from Justice Black with the
same reference to work from Thomas Aquinas that Walsh substituted.298

Other Contemporary Authority: Easterbrook’s Paean to the Era of
Chain Gangs. The other contemporary case most on-point in referencing
the status as non-virtuous in supporting restrictions on civil rights is a
concurring opinion by Judge Easterbrook in David K. v. Lane.299 The case
involves incarcerated prisoners’ claims that failure to enforce state
regulations restricting gang activities in prison violated their Equal
Protection rights, as well as federal regulations.300
Easterbrook uses a concurring opinion in the case to provide ancillary
observations on treatment in prison. Easterbrook’s opinion is untethered
to the doctrine of the causes of action asserted—one would not describe the
opinion as expounding a deductive analysis of the relevant textual source
of law. None of the following character strings appears in the body of
295

Id. (quoting AQUINAS, supra note 293, pt. I–II, question 96, art. 2).

766 So. 2d 501 (La. 2000).
Id. at 506.
298
See 766 So.2d at 511 (substituting “[John Stuart Mill, Thomas Acquinas or Lord
Devlin]” for the texts referenced by Justice Black (footnotes omitted)).
299 839 F.2d 1265, 1278–80 (7th Cir. 1988) (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
300 839 F.2d at 1266–67 (majority opinion).
296
297
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Easterbrook’s opinion: “Equal Protection” or “14th Amendment” or
“Fourteenth Amendment” or “Title VI” (the title on which a federal
regulatory claim was founded)301 or “CFR” or “C.F.R.”302 Of these, only
“Equal Protection” appears in even a footnote (and that only once, to
identify the ultimate conclusion.)303 Rather, after stating, “[Y]ou can’t be a
lion tamer without a whip and chair,”304 Easterbrook opts to denigrate the
complainants as part of supporting rejection of a claim:
The “governed” in prison are not virtuous republican yeomen. The
crowd milling around the mess hall at Pontiac has little in
common with the crowd in the lobby of the Lyric Opera of Chicago
on opening night; it wasn’t good manners that got people
invitations to a maximum-security prison. A legal system that
both requires prison officials to suppress gangs and informs them
that we shall transfer their wealth to the gangs if they act too
firmly asks the impossible.305
These observations are preceded by an apparent paean to the era of
chain gangs and the like:
To cope with gangs, prisons must be able to inflict real
punishments—sanctions going beyond mere presence in a
maximum-security prison, for inmates suffer confinement and
indignity whether they belong to gangs or not.
Thirty years ago a prisoner who wore forbidden insignia or
sassed a guard could find himself on a chain gang. No more. He
might have been thrown in the “hole” or put on bread and water
for a month. No more. That would violate the current
understanding of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. He
might have had parole put off until doomsday, but the reduction of
parole decisionmaking to a largely mechanical process—and the
impending demise of parole under determinate sentencing
schemes—make this less of a threat.

301
302

See 839 F.2d at 1274 (majority opinion).
See 839 F.2d at 1278–80 (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (these character strings not

identified in body text with the following Westlaw search: adv: CI(“839 F.2d 1265”) &
(“equal protection” or “14th amendment” or “fourteenth amendment” or cfr or “c.f.r.” or
“title vi”)).
303
See 839 F.2d at 1279 n.3 (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (“Unless that change would
have improved the minority’s treatment, however, there is no “discrimination” within the
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.”).
304 839 F.2d at 1280 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
305 839 F.2d at 1280 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
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He might have been stripped of good time credits or put in
punitive segregation. These options are open still, but they are
less valuable for two reasons.306

Conclusion. The purpose of our investigation is to illuminate the
intellectual company of those cases that deny Second Amendment rights to
those deemed not “virtuous.” In sum, the raw search statistics suggested
that, as to the rights of the non-virtuous, there is merely a significant
deviation in approach, as between cases referencing the term “Second
Amendment” and those that do not. However, after reviewing the
language of the opinions, it is clear that understates the variation between
the two classes of cases—those referencing “Second Amendment” and
those not.
Within the collected cases not referencing the Second Amendment,
curtailing enumerated rights for those who are not virtuous is not the
norm. And, in the rare modern cases where it was followed, the outcome is
odious, revealing the misuse to which this approach has been put.
VII. CONCLUSION
A number of aspects of treatment of felons’ firearms rights appears to
evidence a hostility to exercise of the civil right. The history of the
statutory restriction reflects an abdication of the legislative duty to make a
considered decision in adopting statutes that curtail express rights—first
allocating that duty to the Executive Branch, then allocating it to the
courts. A class of persons with prior felony convictions—one supposes
generally more affluent—was excluded from the prohibition.307 But there
is no indication that this class of individual is less likely to abuse
criminally the retained firearms rights, as compared to others whose
firearms rights are taken away permanently.
A principle underlying our contemporary schemes for assessing Equal
Protection challenges is to allow invalidation of restrictions on express
rights that are attributable to legislative hostility to their exercise.308 That
appears to be the case at hand, subject to the compounding factor of a
portfolio of exceptions not justified as promoting a suitable interest but,
306
307

Id. at 1278.
See supra notes 43–53 and accompanying text.

In discussing strict scrutiny, Peter Rubin notes:
[T]he inquiry into narrow tailoring—into the fit between classification and
proffered goal—serves at least three distinct purposes. First, it ensures that the
stated purpose was indeed the actual purpose behind the classification. A narrow
tailoring inquiry can help to “smoke out” illegitimate purposes by demonstrating
that the classification does not, in fact, serve the stated, legitimate purpose.”
Peter J. Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose: A Comprehensive Approach to Strict
Scrutiny After Adarand and Shaw, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 14 (2000) (citing City of Richmond
v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion)).
308
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instead, providing special benefit to a class with no identifiable basis for
entitlement.
In the absence of an identifiable interest that is being promoted by the
wholesale elimination of nonviolent felons’ firearms rights, contemporary
courts rely on (i) an assessment of the general philosophy of persons in the
Founding Era, and a theoretical analysis of the implications of those
philosophical viewpoints309 and (ii) a selection of Founding-Era documents
curated with a filter that predetermines a conclusion unsupported by
review of an unfiltered sample.310 That leads contemporary courts to
conclude that the Founders intended for there to be an implicit limit on
the Second Amendment involving firearms restrictions of a type that
simply did not exist in the Founding Era.311
As we have seen, in the Founding Era, there were processes for
restricting firearms rights of persons who were out and about. But, in
contrast to the contemporary statutory scheme, which courts often
summarily validate, the Founding-Era restrictions provided for judicial
tailoring, both as to the identity of persons subject to restrictions as well
as to the duration of the restrictions.312 That is, the Founding-Era
restrictions allowed courts to match the restrictions to meet the rational
objectives—as opposed to the contemporary statutory scheme that makes
no pretense of being designed to do that.
Were Congress to revise the felon firearms prohibition to be of limited
duration, e.g., of five or perhaps ten years, it would be much more difficult
for a court legitimately to find the limited ban to be qualitative different
from the Founding-Era regime.
In modern constitutional jurisprudence, the view that one’s express
constitutional rights can be forfeited because one is “non-virtuous” is
generally rejected outside the context of the Second Amendment.313 And
those modern cases that relied on this principle did so to validate noxious
prohibitions on non-commercial, consensual sexual activity—between
same-sex couples and heterosexual couples.314 The judicial opinions that
rely on this construct to read into the Second Amendment a limit without
a glimmer of textual support, and the authors of those opinions, ought to
be known by—and be held to account for—the odious company that they
keep.
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See supra notes 66, 120–122 and accompanying text.
See supra Part V.D.
See supra Part V.E.
See supra Part V.E.
See supra Part VI.
See supra notes 285–298 and accompanying text.
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